Command and Staff College
Distance Education Program

Fact Book for University Officials

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The CSCDEP Fact Book was developed by the Marine Corps College of Continuing Education's (CCE) academic department. It is designed to inform university officials on the nature and composition of the Marine Corps' intermediate level distance education program. The program is a U.S. Department of Defense, Joint accredited, Joint Professional Military Education (PME) Phase I higher education institution. Students within the program are all college graduates with rare exceptions. Each has had 10-12 years experience as an intermediate level organizational leader/manager. Most have had in excess of two combat tours leading and managing Marines.

Program learning areas, outcomes, and objectives are listed in Enclosures (1) and (2). Enclosure (1) lists the Marine Corps' PME intermediate-level school (ILS) learning outcomes, while Enclosure (2) lists Service ILS Joint PME learning areas and objectives. These requirements are accomplished throughout the program. If institutions need to know which of these requirements are associated to individual courses or program assessments, the Marine Corps CCE can provide this information upon request.

Program Format

The CSCDEP is a 70 week part-time learning program and is CD and online-based. CCE operates on a yearly academic schedule that runs 35 weeks from October to June. Some summer courses are offered. Currently the CCE teaches using four delivery methods: onsite weekly, onsite weekend, blended, and online weekly. The figure on the next page shows the two-year construct for the onsite weekly/weekend methods.

Every student is assigned a seminar with a highly qualified member of the CCE adjunct faculty. Each lesson within a course takes one week; the week after the last lesson is reserved for the final examination. Most students take the course through an onsite seminar; the remainder are provided with an asynchronous, online seminar. Onsite seminars meet once a week for 3 hours. Online seminars have no fixed meeting requirements, but all assignments must be completed by specified times.

Both methods allow students to learn and interact with an instructor and their peers. Each provides a forum where the instructor and students can ask questions and participate in relevant Socratic discussions and learning. All students, both onsite and online, are enrolled and access course assignments, collaborative tools, and assessments through the Blackboard learning support system.

All courses are comprised of a specific number of lessons. Each lesson includes educational objectives; readings, viewings, and recordings; lesson text; and issues for discussion.

Program Information

FIRST YEAR

Oct				Jun
8901 **Theory and Nature of War** **8/9 weeks**	**8902** **National and International Security Studies** **8/9 weeks**	**8903** **Operational Art** **8/9 weeks**	**8904** **Joint Warfighting** **7/8 weeks**	

SECOND YEAR

Oct				Jun
8905 **Small Wars** **8/9 weeks**	**8906** **MAGTF Expeditionary Operations** **9/10 weeks**	**8907** **Amphibious Operations** **4/5 weeks**	**8908** **Operations Planning (and Final Exercise)** **11/11 weeks**	

Standard two-year construct for the onsite weekly/weekend methods.

There are several types of assessments: short multiple choice quizzes, discussion contribution, point papers, extra writing assignments, planning product development, and final essay examinations. After reading a lesson—and before the seminar—students, both onsite and online, must complete the multiple choice quiz in Blackboard. Each lesson has issues for discussion, which students will be asked to address, either in person (for onsite students) or in Blackboard (for online students). The final examination will be an essay assessment, except for the Operation Planning course which will be by practical application.

Program Assessments

Assessments are a combination of examinations and practical applications designed to examine students at all levels of Bloom's Taxonomy. As previously mentioned, CCE is attempting to develop critical thinking and most of the assessments are designed to facilitate the development of and examine that ability. Grading rubrics used to grade final exams and discussion contributions are included in Enclosure (3). Generally, courses comply with the following grading design.

- 20 percent of course grade based on lesson quiz questions (required to be completed before seminar).
- 40 percent based on seminar contribution for the course's issues for discussion.
- 40 percent based on final essay paper.

Program Composition

Lesson	Study/Prep Time [1]	Contact Time [2]
8901, Theory and Nature of War	39.8 hrs	28.0 hrs
8902, National and International Security Studies	29.7 hrs	28.0 hrs
8903, Operational Art	36.9 hrs	28.0 hrs
8904, Joint Warfighting	33.8 hrs	29.0 hrs
8905, Small Wars	39.3 hrs	28.0 hrs
8906, MAGTF Expeditionary Operations	39.8 hrs	35.0 hrs
8907, Amphibious Operations	17.2 hrs	16.0 hrs
8908, Operation Planning (and Final Exercise)	37.2 hrs	33.0 hrs
Total	**273.7 hrs**	**225.0 hrs**

[1] Study and preparation time based on 20 pages of reading per hour.
[2] Contact time is seminar hours plus assessment completion hours.

Individual course descriptions are provided in the following sections.

Faculty

The CSCDEP is designed to be taught at the terminal master's level. All faculty and adjunct faculty are approved by the College of Continuing Education's, Dean of Academics (in Quantico). Criterion for faculty approval includes the candidate's experience (must be a recognized expert in the material he/she is teaching) and education level. The program has a faculty training and supervision program that is run by a regional coordinator (RC) and regional chief instructor (RCI). The RC and RCI handle faculty development, remediate exams, coordinate enrollment, and address academic, administrative, and miscellaneous issues for their region.

Each course comes with an instructor package and an online faculty development site to ensure courses are consistently implemented throughout all regions. In addition to the CCE full-time faculty, the CCE hires part-time adjunct faculty to conduct onsite and online seminars. Our faculty comprises an experienced group of professionals with a unique blend of academic expertise and operational experience. This diverse group of subject matter experts includes active duty and retired military field grade officers from a variety of specialties and terminal degree-holding civilian academics. These individuals possess an eclectic blend of knowledge, skills, and experiences that greatly enhance student learning.

The CCE has been commended for its quality of faculty and was recognized by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for best practices in distance education within the uniformed Services.

Contact Information

For more information on the Marine Corps CCE or CSCDEP contact the following individuals:

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8901, Theory and Nature of War

8901, *Theory and Nature of War,* introduces students to important military theory and describes its impact on how we conduct war. The student will read selected works of history's greatest military theorists and then compare and contrast their theories. By applying these theories to selected eras and events in military history, students will be able to analyze the evolution of warfare from the 17th century to the present, and recognize and describe the nature of change in the characteristics of war in selected time frames. This course also discusses the concept of an "American way of war" and how it helped frame how Marines think about and conduct war.

Course Composition

Lesson	Study/Prep Time [1]	Contact Time [2]
Lesson 1, Marine Corps Warfighting/Classic Theorist: Sun Tzu	6.3 hrs	3.0 hrs
Lesson 2, The Age of Limited War to the Age of Revolutionary Warfare	4.6 hrs	3.0 hrs
Lesson 3, Classical Theorists: Clausewitz and Jomini	6.3 hrs	3.0 hrs
Lesson 4, Civil War and the Imperial Period	4.0 hrs	3.0 hrs
Lesson 5, Naval Theory: Mahan and Corbett	2.5 hrs	3.0 hrs
Lesson 6, 20th Century Warfare: World War I	4.1 hrs	3.0 hrs
Lesson 7, 20th Century Warfare: Interwar Period of Concept Development and Innovation/World War II	3.5 hrs	3.0 hrs
Lesson 8, The Cold War and Future War	4.5 hrs	3.0 hrs
Final Exam	4.0 hrs	4.0 hrs
Total	**39.8 hrs**	**28.0 hrs**

[1]   Study and preparation time based on 20 pages of reading per hour.
[2]   Contact time is seminar hours plus assessment completion hours.

Course Objectives

Each lesson has specific educational objectives, which have been derived from the following Marine Corps PME ILS Learning Outcomes (found in Enclosure (1)):

Area 1				Area 2					Area 3						Area 4			Area 5			
A	B	C	D	A	B	C	D	E	A	B	C	D	E	F	A	B	C	A	B	C	D
						X	X	X	X	X		X		X							

Course Overview

The *Theory and Nature of War* course uses the works of important military theorists and selected historical eras, wars, campaigns, or battles to illustrate the evolution of warfare since the 17th century. The course follows a historical sequence to the greatest extent possible.

Lesson 1, Marine Corps Warfighting/Classic Theorist: Sun Tzu, explains the Marine Corps' warfighting philosophy and introduces students to the theory of war, as described by Sun Tzu. The Marine Corps has developed and embraced a warfighting philosophy based on maneuver warfare, which is the basis for Marine Corps operations, doctrine, and professional military education. Understanding this warfighting philosophy allows us to comprehend how Marines fight battles, and how they join with other Services and nations to conduct campaigns and win wars. Central to Marine Corps warfighting is the concept of maneuver warfare—a style of "warfare by maneuver which stems from a desire to circumvent a problem and attack it from a position of advantage rather than meet it straight on."

The Art of War, written by the ancient Chinese military theorist Sun Tzu, is then explored for guidance concerning political/military relations, maneuver warfare, and information operations. Sun Tzu is one of several important military theorists that have helped to shape the Marine Corps warfighting philosophy and our understanding of maneuver warfare. His classic book describes a warfighting theory that bypasses enemy strengths and attacks enemy weaknesses. He introduces the notion of asymmetric attack and offers the modern student of war many relevant and timely lessons on conducting military operations.

Read:

- Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 1, *Warfighting* (1997): pp. 3 to 9, 23 to 32, 36 to 40, 45 to 48, 72 to 95 (50 pages).
- MCDP 6, *Command and Control* (1996): pp. 36 to 41, 47 to 54, 63 to 71, 107 to 117 (34 pages).
- *The Art of War* (1963). Sun Tzu (translated by Samuel B. Griffith): pp. 63 to 69, 73, 77 to 80, 82 to 84, 96 to 101, 106 to 109, 134 to 140 (32 pages).

Lesson 2, The Age of Limited War to the Age of Revolutionary Warfare, covers the revolution of military affairs that started in the 17th century and featured the transition from limited wars fought by dynastic rulers to revolutionary wars driven by nationalism.

The period of history covered in this lesson (1648-1815) witnessed a revolution in military affairs—not based on new technology, but on new political, societal, strategic, and tactical ideas—reflecting a changing Europe and a developing New World. The small professional armies of dynastic rulers, whose mercenary soldiers were capable of only limited war, were replaced with national armies, comprised of citizens capable of decisive victories because they were motivated by a spirit of liberty and a sense of nation. We will look at the composition and employment of the Continental Army in the American Revolution to determine the impact this transformation had on the emerging American way of war.

This lesson also discusses Napoleon: how he applied the results of this revolution in military affairs to his campaigns; and his contributions to modern war, particularly his innovations in operational art and command and control, which still affect how we fight wars today.

Read:

- "Maurice of Nassau, Gustavus Adolphus, Raimondo, Montecuccoli, and the 'Military Revolution' of the Seventeenth Century." Gunther Rothenburg. *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age* (1986). Peter Paret (ed.): pp. 32 to 37, 40 to 55 (21 pages).
- "Frederick the Great, Guibert, Bulow: From Dynastic to National War." R.R. Palmer. *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age* (1986). Peter Paret (ed.): pp. 91 to 105 (15 pages).
- The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy (1973). Russell F. Weigley: pp. 3 to 5, 11 to 39 (28 pages).
- "Napoleon and the Revolution in War." Peter Paret. *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age* (1986). Peter Paret (ed.): pp. 124 to 142 (21 pages).

Lesson 3, Classical Theorists: Clausewitz and Jomini, covers the theories of these two officers (Baron Antoine Henri Jomini and General Carl von Clausewitz) who had a tremendous impact on the conduct of war in the 19th and 20th Centuries. Military thought throughout the 19th century and into the early 20th century was dominated by their writings. Following the Napoleonic Wars, these officers published their observations of the great leaders of their time—Frederick the Great and Napoleon. Their respective theories of war were distilled from their own wartime experiences and the campaigns of Frederick and Napoleon. Both of these theorists have held ascendancy in military thinking at various times, but both men provided valuable and lasting understanding to the art of war.

Read:

- *The Art of War* (1992). Baron Antoine Henri de Jomini (translated by CPT G.H. Mendell, USA, and 1LT W.P. Craighill, USA): pp. 12 to13, 26 to 27, 59 to 63, 65 to 83, 91 to 95, 293 to 297 (37 pages).
- *European Armies and the Conduct of War* (1983). Hew Strachan: pp. 60 to 65 (5 pages).
- *On War* (1976). Carl Clausewitz (edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret): pp. 75 to 80, 84 to 102, 119 to 121, 357 to 359, 479 to 483, 566 to 573, 579 to 581, 595 to 596 (49 pages).
- "Clausewitz." Peter Paret. *Makers of Modern Strategy From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age* (1986). Peter Paret (ed.): pp. 188 to 213 (28 pages).

Lesson 4, Civil War and the Imperial Period, concentrates on the American way of war as it further developed during the Civil War and how American armed presence affected other nations during the Spanish American War.

The American Civil War (1861-1865) was a seminal event in American history, which shaped the country of today. It also had an impact on the evolution of the American military. The Civil War witnessed the transition from Napoleonic warfare to the near total wars of the 20th century, and was a proving ground for new technologies, organizations, and doctrine. While some American generals attempted to employ the doctrines of Napoleon, other leaders developed warfighting styles that exploited manpower and industrial output advantages. Total war, which involved civilians and the economic system of the South, eventually replaced the more chivalrous approach to war practiced earlier in the conflict.

The Spanish-American War (1898) was a major milestone on America's road to becoming a major world power. The defeat of Spain and the ceding of its territories in the Western Hemisphere and the Pacific Ocean resulted in America becoming a colonial power with its own distinct blend of imperialism and exportation of American democratic values and institutions. The American military also transformed from a frontier constabulary to a force capable of projecting American power abroad.

Read:

- *The American Way of War* (1973). Russell F. Weigley: pp. 92 to 127 (35 pages).
- *The American Way of War* (1973). Russell F. Weigley: pp. 128 to 152 (25 pages).
- For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States of America (1994). Allan R. Millett and Peter Maslowski: pp. 284 to 300 (17 pages).

Lesson 5, Naval Theory: Mahan and Corbett, covers the theories of these two analysts and the impact of sea power on modern warfare. Before World War I, the navies of the major powers were undergoing a revolution. In size, appearance, and armaments, warships changed radically between 1890 and 1914. Trying to figure out how to employ these fleets became the critical issue for some thinkers, most notably Alfred Thayer Mahan and Sir Julian Corbett. Both were heavily influenced by the experiences of the Royal Navy, especially during the Napoleonic Wars. Each, however, produced a very different interpretation from their respective studies.

Mahan—a pillar of the new Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, and an Admiral—was the son of Dennis Hart Mahan, a well-known teacher at West Point. Like his father, Mahan was ardently Jominian: Mahan's books applied Jominian principles to naval warfare. From his point of view, history (especially British history) held many lessons about the complex relations between land power and sea power. Believing that traditional historians and military historians had neglected to cite the role of the sea and navies in world affairs, Mahan intended to fill this gap. His classic book, *The Influence of Sea Power upon History*, sets forth his principles while discussing 17th and 18th century fleet operations.

Corbett's most important work, *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy*, reflects a Clausewitzian approach. Corbett was impressed with Clausewitz's handling of military matters as always carrying a political purpose, and the notion of limited versus unlimited war. His study of British naval operations led him to emphasize their "joint" nature.

Read:

- "Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Naval Historian." Phillip A. Crowl. *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age* (1986). Peter Paret (ed.): pp. 449 to 451, 461 to 463 (6 pages).
- *The American Way of War* (1977). Russell F. Weigley: pp. 173 to 191 (18 pages).
- *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy* (1988) (reprint of 1911 edition). Julian S Corbett: pp. 91 to 106 (16 pages).

Lesson 6, 20th Century Warfare: World War I, does not describe or discuss specific military operations of World War I; rather, it facilitates an understanding of the organizational structures, alliances, and innovations that were relevant in World War I. The lesson also examines the effect this conflict had on future military thinking and analyzes how it changed the character of warfare in the interwar years.

Even though World War I was a unique event, it did have some of the same traits as past conflicts. The Napoleonic Wars (1803-1815) were an era of unlimited war—destroying the enemy's army, capturing the enemy's capitol, and subjugating the enemy's state. During the latter half of the 19th century, the Prussians conducted limited war—destroying a specific enemy capability, annexing a portion of the enemy's territory, and liberating an ethnic minority. With the onset of World War I, the pendulum swung back to the unlimited war model.

Read:

- "The Schlieffen 'Plan'—Genesis of the Western Front" (online article). Correlli Barnett: (10 pages).
- "The Prusso-German School: Moltke and the Rise of the General Staff." Hajo Holborn. *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age* (1986). Peter Paret (ed.): pp. 281 to 284 (stop at start of Section I) (3 pages).
- "Moltke, Schlieffen, and the Doctrine of Strategic Envelopment." Gunther E.Rothenberg. *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age* (1986). Peter Paret (ed.): pp. 296 to 325. (29 pages).
- "Men Against Fire: The Doctrine of the Offensive in 1914." Michael Howard. *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age* (1986). Peter Paret (ed.): pp. 510 to 526 (17 pages).
- *The American Way of War* (1977). Russell F. Weigley: pp. 212 to 222 (11 pages).

Listen:

- Interview with Hew Strachan: (10 minutes).

Lesson 7, 20th Century Warfare: Interwar Period of Concept Development and Innovation/World War II, discusses the way World War II changed the character of warfare and its long-term impact on the American way of war. Unlike World War I, World War II was truly global in character and scope. Although World War I had fighting outside of Europe (in the Middle East and parts of Africa), the armies of World War II battled throughout Europe, Russia, North Africa, the Far East, and the islands of the Pacific, with naval and air forces fighting over an even larger geographic area.

World War II still impacts warfare theory in the modern era. Understanding World War II in its historical context is vital as many of today's complex political issues can be traced to it.

Read:

- *The American Way of War* (1977). Russell F. Weigley: pp.223 to 241 (19 pages).
- FMFRP 12-34, *History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II: Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal* (1959), Vol. I: pp. 9 to 15 (start at UPS AND DOWNS OF THE NINETEEN TWENTIES; stop at COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS); pp. 17 to 20 (start at AIR SUPPORT; stop at SHORE PARTY) (8 pages).
- *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* (1989). Paul Kennedy: pp. 347 to 359 (12 pages).
- *European Armies and the Conduct of War* (1983). Hew Strachan: pp. 163 to 187 (22 pages).

Lesson 8, The Cold War and Future War, describes how nuclear weapons changed the character of warfare, and how the United States had to make the transition from the total war approach, which was so successful in World War II, to a limited war approach to counter Soviet proxies and fight wars of national liberation. This lesson also covers the post-Cold War period and current efforts to transform how we think about war, as we face the threat of terrorism in the 21st century.

The Cold War was the restricted struggle that developed after World War II between the United States and its allies, and the Soviet Union and its bloc of satellite states. The Cold War was waged using all the instruments of national power: economic pressure, selective aid, diplomatic maneuver, propaganda, assassination, intimidation, low-intensity military operations, and full-scale proxy war.

The future of warfare has become markedly less certain with the demise of the Soviet Union and the rivalry of the Cold War era. The collapse of the Soviet Union has not presaged the end of war. Indeed, the United States still finds itself conducting major military actions; dealing with nonstate and transnational actors as well as nation-states. The only certainty is that war, in its various forms, will continue in the future.

Read:

- "A Look at the Great Wars of the Twentieth Century." Donald Kagan. *The Naval War College Review* (Autumn 2000): pp. 11 to 24 (13 pages).
- "The Source of Soviet Conduct." George Kennan. *Foreign Affairs* (Spring 1987), Vol. 65.4: pp. 566 to 582 (17 pages).
- "The First Two Generations of Nuclear Strategists." Lawrence Freedman. *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age* (1986). Peter Paret (ed.): pp. 735 to 744 (10 pages).
- *The American Way of War* (1977). Russell F. Weigley: pp. 455 to 468 (14 pages).
- *The Army in Vietnam* (1986). Andrew Krepinevich, Jr.: pp. 274 to 275 (2 pages)
- "How Has War Changed Since the End of The Cold War?" Colin S. Gray. *Parameters* (Spring 2005): 14 to 26 (12 pages).

- "The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation." William Lind, Col Keith Nightengale, Capt. John Schmitt, Col Joseph Sutton, Lt Col Gary Wilson. *Marine Corps Gazette* (October 1989): pp. 22 to 26 (5 pages).
- "Fifth Generation Warfare." Anonymous. *Federalist Patriot* (14 March 2005): pp. 1 to 7 (7 pages).

Course Assessments

Students will be evaluated through three types of assessment activities: 40 points for discussion contribution, 20 points for multiple choice quizzes, and 40 points for the essay final examination—for a total of 100 points. A mastery score of 80 points for the entire course is required to pass.

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8902, National and International Security Studies

8902, *National and International Security Studies*, provides students the requisite knowledge of the national security structure expected of field grade officers operating in a joint environment. Officers at this level can expect assignments that require not only knowledge of the national security environment, but the ability to synthesize that knowledge (the means) to develop and convey strategies (the ways), which lead to the accomplishment of complex tasks (the ends). 8901, *Theory and Nature of War*, provided the foundation for this course, while 8903, *Operational Art*, (which follows) will take what is learned here to facilitate a better understanding of the application of the military instrument of national power.

Course Composition

Lesson	Study/Prep Time [1]	Contact Time [2]
Lesson 1, Strategy	2.6 hrs	3.0 hrs
Lesson 2, Instruments of National Power	2.9 hrs	3.0 hrs
Lesson 3, National Security Decisionmaking	3.3 hrs	3.0 hrs
Lesson 4, National Strategic Framework	4.9 hrs	3.0 hrs
Lesson 5, Joint Strategic Planning	3.8 hrs	3.0 hrs
Lesson 6, Understanding Culture	3.4 hrs	3.0 hrs
Lesson 7, Alliances and Coalitions	2.5 hrs	3.0 hrs
Lesson 8, Conflict Termination	2.3 hrs	3.0 hrs
Final Exam	4.0 hrs	4.0 hrs
Total	**29.7 hrs**	**28.0 hrs**

[1]   Study and preparation time based on 20 pages of reading per hour.
[2]   Contact time is seminar hours plus assessment completion hours.

Course Objectives

Each lesson has specific educational objectives, which have been derived from the following Marine Corps PME ILS Learning Outcomes (found in Enclosure (1)):

Area 1				Area 2					Area 3						Area 4			Area 5			
A	B	C	D	A	B	C	D	E	A	B	C	D	E	F	A	B	C	A	B	C	D
X	X	X	X		X	X		X		X	X	X					X		X		

Course Overview

The *National and International Security Studies* lessons follow a natural progression and are designed to present the national and international aspects of the nation's security framework. Each part of this framework is inextricably tied to the others; as it is being presented, nothing should be viewed as a discrete subject unto itself.

Lesson 1, Strategy, explores the art of applying means (instruments of national power) towards ends (objectives derived from interests).While strategy is often shrouded in mystery with a language of its own; the concepts comprising the study of strategy are relatively straightforward. The same cannot be said regarding the "art" of applying these concepts in the advancement of national interests. Field Marshall Helmuth Graf von Moltke made this point when he said, "strategy is the application of common sense to the conduct of war. The difficulty lies in its execution…."

Before the end of World War II, strategy was thought to be the province of the military. Now, strategy is recognized as a key component in international relations. Nations do not use force as an end in itself. Rather, the use or threat of force must serve a political objective. Strategy dictates how the use of all the instruments of national power (**diplomatic, informational, military, and economic**) advances a nation's interests.

Read:

- MCDP 1-1, *Strategy* (12 November 1997): pp. 37 to 60 (24 Pages in Chapter 2).
- "The state of the National Security State." David Jablonsky. *Parameters* (Winter 2002-03): pp.4 to 18 (15 pages).
- "Why Strategy is Difficult." Colin Gray. *Joint Forces Quarterly* (Summer 1999) pp. 7 to 12 (5 pages).

Lesson 2, Instruments of National Power, discusses the instruments of power (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic) with an emphasis on their integrated application. Additionally, there are other tangible instruments, such as geography, population, information, and economics. Some of the less tangible instruments of power include national will, climate, and governmental effectiveness.

States pursue their values and interests, in peacetime and war, through policies and strategies. Because strategy deals with the ways employed by states in pursuit of achieving political objectives, government and military leaders must be aware of all resources at their disposal. Some of these are not always obvious, can change during the course of a struggle, and need to be adapted to the situation. Adversaries of the United States will seek to counter our strategy and neutralize or defeat the instruments of power with their own resources; therefore, we also need to understand enemy strengths and limitations, and how their instruments of power interrelate.

Read:

- "National Power." David Jablonsky. *Parameters* (Spring 1997): pp. 34 to 50 (17 pages).
- "Shades of Gray: Gradual Escalation and Coercive Diplomacy." Alan J. Stephenson. *Essays* (2002): (13 pages).

- "Strategic Communication." Jeffrey B. Jones. *Joint Forces Quarterly* (4th Quarter 2005), 39: pp. 108 to 114 (7 pages).
- "Economics and National Security: The Dangers of Overcommitment." David P. H. Denoon. *The Global Century* (2001). Richard L. Kugler and Ellen L. Frost (ed.): pp. 241 to 255 (14 pages).

Lesson 3, National Security Decisionmaking, defines the roles of the National Security Council, the Interagency System, and Congress in the national security decision making process. The national security decisionmaking process includes many departments and agencies. Among these are the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the intelligence community, and since 9/11 the Department of Homeland Security. The U.S. Constitution provides the framework for national security policymaking. The objective of national security policy-making is to protect and extend national interests within the framework of national values and institutions.

Throughout the twentieth century, presidential power has increased. However, this has not gone unchallenged on Capitol Hill: Congress has enlarged its staffs and committees, added new institutions, and continues to exert its authority through the power of the purse. In addition, the various departments and agencies of the federal government advance their own institutional interests and vie with one another for resources and funding. Within this framework, national security strategy is created.

Read:

- "The National Security Policy Process: The National Security Council and Interagency System" (2008). Alan G. Whittaker, Frederick C. Smith, Ambassador Elizabeth McKune: pp. 51 to 69 (19 pages).
- "Rice Fails to Repair Rift, Officials Say; Cabinet Rivalries Complicate Her Role." Glenn Kessler and Peter Slevin. *The Washington Post* (Oct 12, 2003): (5 pages).
- "The Futility of Homeland Defense." David Carr. *The Atlantic Monthly* (January 2002): (4 pages).
- "Congress and National Security Policy." Frederick M. Kaiser (James C. Gaston, ed.). *Grand Strategy and the Decisionmaking Process* (1992): pp. 213 to 237 (25 pages).

View:

- Interactive Media Element (IME) *National Security Decisionmaking.*

Lesson 4, National Strategic Framework, examines the framework for developing strategy and planning force structure. The end of the Cold War and the rise of terrorism changed the U.S. strategic environment in a monumental way. The 2006 National Security Strategy is the second to be developed in the aftermath of 9/11. This document provides the guidance for development of the National Military Strategy. The National Defense Strategy is an intermediary document that further informs the development of the National Military Strategy.

The concepts of risk and cost minimization are a critical part of strategy development. In a perfect world, the size of the force would be derived strictly from an assessment of

what is needed to achieve national security objectives. However, the nation's resources are not unlimited and it must be determined how much risk is acceptable.

Read:

- "From Here to There: The Strategy and Force Planning Framework." P.H. Liotta and Richmond M. Lloyd. *Naval War College Review* (Spring 2005): pp. 121-136 (15 pages).
- *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 2006*: (available online http://whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/: (48 pages).
- *The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, 2005*, Executive Summary (available online http://globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/dod): (1 page).
- *The National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 2004* (available online http://jdeis.cornerstoneindustry.com/jdeis/index.jsp): (27 pages).

Scan:

- *The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, 2005,* (available online http://globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/dod): pp. 1-24 (24 pages).

Lesson 5, Joint Strategic Planning, introduces the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) and related systems. The JSPS provides formal structure to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's (CJCS) statutory responsibilities for strategic planning. The Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process is how the Department of Defense provides the resources, or means, to U.S. strategy. The final interrelated system, the Joint Operational Planning and Execution System (JOPES), is discussed in 8903, *Operational Art.*

The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 increased the power of the CJCS, particularly as it relates to strategic planning. The JSPS provides formal structure, so the Chairman can carry out the legal responsibilities assigned to him by law. These roles are (1) to conduct independent **assessments**; (2) to provide independent **advice** to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and others; and (3) to assist President and Secretary of Defense in providing unified **direction** to the military.

The PPBE process ensures the military has the means to fulfill its national strategy. It assures professional, military programmatic advice through the participation of the CJCS and the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the combatant commanders; and selected Defense Agency officials. The ultimate objective of the PPBE process is to provide the combatant commanders with the capabilities (i.e., the best mix of forces, equipment, and support within the budget) to protect U.S. national interests and achieve national security objectives.

Read:

- CJCSI 3100.01B, *Joint Strategic Planning System* (12 December 08): pp. A-1 to A-10 (10 pages).

- Joint Pub 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States* (14 May 2007): pp. II-1 to II-7 (6 pages).
- "Strategic Planning by the Chairmen, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1990 to 2005." Richard Meinhart. *Strategic Studies Institute* (April 2006): pp. 1 to 25 (25 pages).
- CJCSI 8501.01A, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Combatant Commanders, and Joint Staff Participation in the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System (3 December 2004): pp. A-1 to A-5 (5 pages).
- CJCSI 3170.01F, *Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System* (1 May 2007): pp. A-1 to A-5 (4 pages).
- "Resourcing the Force in the Midst of Complexity: The Need to Deflate the 'ppb' in PPBE." Dr. Christopher R. Paparone. *Army Logistician* (March/April 2007): (9 pages).

Lesson 6, Understanding Culture, explains the overarching rationale for understanding culture. It is not something to be learned simply to avoid offending others. Understanding culture is a capability to be honed and employed in the pursuit of the nation's interests. This lesson underscores these points, looks at some actionable ways to improve our cultural literacy, and ends with a look at this subject in regard to The Middle East and China.

Webster's Dictionary defines culture as "the totality of socially transmitted behavior patterns, arts, beliefs, institutions, and all other products of human work and thought … [and] a style of social and artistic expression peculiar to a class or society."

While definitions provide a common understanding, with respect to culture we have to move far beyond simply defining the word. The increased emphasis throughout the Department of Defense to better understand foreign cultures is a clear indication of current deficiencies within the military. With U.S. forces deployed throughout the world, and in many cases interacting with the local populace on a daily basis, understanding local cultures is critical to mission success.

Read:

- "The Military Utility of Understanding Culture." Montgomery McFate. *Joint Forces Quarterly* 38 (3rd Quarter 2005): pp. 42-48 (7 pages).
- "Cultural Intelligence and Joint Intelligence Doctrine" (2005) (U.S. Air University essay submission). John P. Coles: pp. 1 to 12 (12 pages).
- "Military Cultural Education." Maxie McFarland. *Military Review* (March-April 2005): pp. 62 to 69 (8 pages).
- "War Against Global Terrorism: Winning the Hearts, Minds, and Souls of the Muslim World" (2004) (U.S. Air War College essay submission). Ling Wee Lee: pp. 57 to 72 (16 pages).
- DOD Report to Congress of the U.S.-China Security Review Commission: The National Security Implications of the Economic Relationship between the United States and China (July 2002): pp. 89 to 94 (6 pages in Chapter 1).

View:

- Talk on Middle East Cultural Issues with Ralph Peters: (24 minutes).

Lesson 7, Alliances and Coalitions, addresses the differences between alliances and coalitions, and the advantages and limitations inherent when operating within either, along with a look at NATO and the UN.

The United States routinely conducts multinational operations with alliances or coalitions. They must be planned and executed to achieve common objectives, facilitate unity of effort without diminishing freedom of action, and preserve unit integrity and uninterrupted support. Each multinational operation is unique, so considerations for planning and conducting multinational operations vary with the international situation; national goals; and motives, cultural perspectives, and values of the organization's members.

Participating nations may lead, support, or contribute to multinational operations. In the past, U.S. forces normally played a central leadership role, as they were the predominant, most capable force. However, the United States is now encouraging regional powers and organizations to take a more prominent role in multinational operations within their geographic/geopolitical areas.

Read:

- "Alliance and Coalition Warfare." Wayne A. Silkett. *Parameters* (Summer 1993): pp. 74 to 83 (10 pages).
- "Trust, Not Technology, Sustains Coalitions." Robert H. Scales, Jr. *Parameters* (Winter 1998): pp. 4 to 10 (7 pages).
- "The UN in Brief": pp. 1 to 10 (9 pages).
- "NATO Decisionmaking: Au Revoir to the Consensus Rule?" Leo G. Michel. *Strategic Forum* 202 (August 2003): pp. 1 to 8 (8 pages).
- "NATO after Prague: Learning the Lessons of 9/11." Michael Rühle. *Parameters* (Summer 2003): pp. 89 to 97 (9 pages).

Lesson 8, Conflict Termination, studies the importance of addressing the conditions for successful conflict termination during initial planning and the need for reassessment throughout hostilities. Normally, military operations do not terminate with the conclusion of sustained combat operations; military victory is not the same as conflict termination.

Knowing how and when to terminate military operations is part of strategy and operational art. Before forces are committed, the joint force commander (JFC) must know how the President and the Secretary of Defense intend to terminate the operation and ensure it achieves an enduring outcome. With this information, the JFC can determine how to implement the strategic design at the operational level.

Read:

- "Planning for Conflict Termination and Post-Conflict Success." William Flavin. *Parameters* (Autumn 2003): pp. 95 to 111 (16 pages).
- "War Termination and Joint Planning." Robert R. Soucy II, Kevin A. Shwedo, and John S. Haven II. *Joint Forces Quarterly* (Summer 1995): pp. 96 to 101 (5 pages).

- "Avoiding a Napoleonic Ulcer: Bridging the Gap of Cultural Intelligence (Or, Have We Focused on the Wrong Transformation?)" (2004) George W. Smith Jr. Marine Corps War College: pp. 21 to 36 (16 pages).

Course Assessments

Students will be evaluated through three types of assessment activities: 40 points for discussion contribution, 20 points for multiple choice quizzes, and 40 points for the essay final examination—for a total of 100 points. A mastery score of 80 points for the entire course is required to pass.

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8903, Operational Art

8903, *Operational Art,* focuses on operational warfare, campaigning, and transforming strategic guidance into the employment of military forces at the operational level. In modern warfare, a sound, coherent strategy alone is not sufficient to ensure a decisive victory; neither is a military force, however well trained in tactics, sufficient by itself to ensure success. Because military forces and the battlespace involved have grown exponentially since the 19th century, an intermediate level of theoretical study, planning, and practice emerged to link strategy and tactics—operational art.

National security operations should be coordinated from the highest level of policymaking—strategy—to the basic level of execution—tactics. The operational level links the two levels, providing direction and purpose to campaigns and other military operations. As the bridge between strategy and tactics, the operational level is where campaigns are designed and conducted. It interacts with strategy to create military art that:

- Designates military objectives to satisfy the desired strategic end state (**ends**).
- Determines a suitable method to achieve the designated objectives (**ways**).
- Assigns forces and resources to the tasks to be accomplished (**means**).

The operational level interacts with tactics—including the use of forces, resources, and missions—to achieve military success.

Course Composition

Lesson	Study/Prep Time [1]	Contact Time [2]
Lesson 1, Operational Art	2.6 hrs	3.0 hrs
Lesson 2, Service Warfare	2.9 hrs	3.0 hrs
Lesson 3, Joint Force Organization	3.3 hrs	3.0 hrs
Lesson 4, Campaigning	4.9 hrs	3.0 hrs
Lesson 5, Joint Operation Planning	3.8 hrs	3.0 hrs
Lesson 6, Culture and Warfighting	3.4 hrs	3.0 hrs
Lesson 7, Information Operations	2.5 hrs	3.0 hrs
Lesson 8, Conflict Termination and Resolution	2.3 hrs	3.0 hrs
Final Exam	4.0 hrs	4.0 hrs
Total	**36.9 hrs**	**28.0 hrs**

[1] Study and preparation time based on 20 pages of reading per hour.
[2] Contact time is seminar hours plus assessment completion hours.

Course Objectives

Each lesson has specific educational objectives, which have been derived from the following Marine Corps PME ILS Learning Outcomes (found in Enclosure (1)):

Area 1				Area 2					Area 3						Area 4			Area 5			
A	B	C	D	A	B	C	D	E	A	B	C	D	E	F	A	B	C	A	B	C	D
X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X				X									

Course Overview

8903, *Operational Art*, covers operational-level warfare and the art of campaigning. The course uses a historical case study, theory, and current doctrine to improve a student's ability to derive operational insights from any situation and exercise judgment to achieve success on the battlefield.

Lesson 1, Operational Art, introduces operational art and campaign design. Operational art is one of the three components of military art, along with strategy and tactics. Operational art also includes operational design to support campaign or operation plans and their subsequent execution. Finally, the lesson introduces the Operation DESERT STORM case study, which will be used throughout the rest of the course.

Read:

- MCDP 1, *Warfighting* (1997): pp. 28 to 32 (3 pages).
- "Piercing the Veil of Operational Art." *Parameters* (Summer 1995). Ralph L. Allen: pp. 111 to 119 (9 pages).
- JP 3-0, *Joint Operations* (2006): pp. IV-3 (1 page).
- "Operational Art's Origin." *Military Review* (Sep-Oct 1997). Bruce W. Menning: pp. 32-47 (13 pages).
- JP 3-0, *Joint Operations* (2006): pp. IV-4 to IV-20 (14 pages).
- MCDP 1, *Warfighting* (1997): pp. 45 to 47 (3 pages).
- "Campaign Design for Winning the War...and the Peace." *Parameters* (Summer 2005). Pierre Lessard: pp. 36 to 50 (12 pages).

Reference:

- *Joint Military Operations Historical Collection* (1997): pp. V-1 to V-15 (15 pages).

Lesson 2, Service Warfare, presents an overview of the separate Services and the capabilities, organization, and unique planning considerations needed for their employment within a joint force at the operational level. This lesson also examines emerging concepts that will determine how Services and the joint force will be structured and equipped in the future.

Read:

- Field Manual (FM) 1, *The Army* (2005): pp. 2-8 to 2-13 (6 pages).
- FM 1, *The Army* (2005): pp. 3-4 to 3-12 (8 pages).
- FM 3, *Operations* (2008): pp. C-1 to C-13, (8 pages).
- "New Command Unifies the Fleet." *Proceedings* (January 2002). Admiral Robert J. Natter: pp. 72 to 74 (3 pages).
- "Transforming the 21st Century Surface Navy." *Armed Forces Journal* (September 2002). VADM Phillip M. Balisle: pp. 62 to 66 (4 pages).
- Coast Guard Publication 1, *U.S. Coast Guard: America's Maritime Guardian* (2002): pp. 5 to 14, (8 pages).
- "A Joint and Interoperable Maritime Force." *Integrated Deepwater System-News* (30 March 2006). Gordon I. Peterson (2 pages).
- Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2, *Operations and Organization*, 2006, pp. 35 to 38, 43 to 44, and 46 to 49 (8 pages).
- Air Force Instruction 10-400, "Aerospace Expeditionary Force (AEF) Concept," 2002, pp. 6 to 10 (5 pages).
- *U.S. Special Operations Forces Posture Statement*, 2003-2004, pp. 7 to 13 and 63 to 72 (14 pages).

View:

- Air Command and Staff College (ACSC) lecture, "America's Army" (2005). LTC Holland, USA: (24 minutes).
- ACSC lecture, "Naval Capabilities Lecture" (2005). LCDR Dvorak, USN: (35 minutes).

Lesson 3, Joint Force Organization, covers joint warfare, joint force command and control, and organizing and employing joint and multinational forces effectively and efficiently. Joint force commanders (JFCs) must know the capabilities and limitations of their forces, so they can integrate and synchronize operations and apply force from different dimensions to shock, disrupt, and defeat the enemies.

Read:

- Joint Military Operations Historical Collection (1997): pp. v to xii (8 pages).
- JP 3-0, *Joint Operations* (2006): pp. A-1 to A-5 (5 pages).
- *The Generals' War* (1995). Michael R. Gordon and LtGen. (Ret.) Bernard E. Trainor: Chapter 3 (19 pages).
- JP 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States* (2007): pp. IV-1 to IV-13, V-2 to V-12, and V-17 to V-20 (21 pages).
- JP 3-0, *Joint Operations* (2006): pp. II-15 to II-19 (4 pages).

Lesson 4, Campaigning, introduces the concept of a joint campaign and its relationship to the operational level of war. It also covers the elements of campaign planning, where the commander's vision and intent serve as the basis for the plan that directs the employment of joint forces in accomplishing strategic objectives.

Read:

- MCDP 1-2, *Campaigning* (1997): pp. 3 to 18 (14 pages).
- JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning* (2006): pp. IV-2 to IV-4 (2 pages).
- JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning* (2006): pp. III-5 to III-9 and III-11; IV-32 to IV-38 (8 pages).
- MCDP 1-2, *Campaigning* (1997), pp. 44 to 48 (5 pages).
- *The Generals' War* (1995): Chapters 6 and 7 (36 pages).
- JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning* (2006): pp. I-9 to I-10, IV-5 to IV-6, and IV-31 (3 pages).
- MCDP 1-2, *Campaigning* (1997): pp. 59 to 60 (2 pages).

Lesson 5, Joint Operation Planning, covers the joint operation planning systems and processes, which provide joint military forces the means to develop plans and orders that are necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Joint operation planning translates strategic goals into military actions, and this planning is done using the Joint Operational Planning and Execution System (JOPES) and the joint operation planning process (JOPP). The JOPES and JOPP provide the joint military forces the means to develop plans and orders that are necessary to accomplish assigned missions.

Read:

- JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning* (2006): pp. I-11 to I-13 and I-23 to I-26 (5 pages).
- JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning* (2006): pp. I-5 to I-6 and I-13 to I-16 (4 pages).
- JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning* (2006): pp. I-17 to I-22, III-3, and III-19 to III-22; III-28; III-30 to III-34; III-41 (12 pages).
- JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*, 2006, pp. I-3 to I-4 (1 page).
- JFSC Pub 1, *The Joint Staff Officer's Guide*, 2000, pp. 3-29 to 3-32 (4 pages).
- *The Generals' War* (1995): Chapters 13 and 14 (40 pages).

View:

- Interactive Media Element, *Crisis Action Planning* (25 minutes).

Lesson 6, Culture and Warfighting, discusses culture at the operational level, focusing on how cultural understanding can help meet operational objectives. It considers improvements the U.S. military has achieved in cultural awareness based on recent military experiences in the Middle East and provides insights for effectively dealing with people of foreign cultures.

Read:

- FMFRP 12-15, *Small Wars Manual* (Reprint of 1940 ed.):Ch 1, p. 19 (1 page).
- *The Ugly American.* William Lederer and Eugene Burdick, pp. 66 to 73 (8 pages).
- "Winning the Peace. The Requirement for Full-Spectrum Operations." *Military Review* (July-August 2005). Peter W. Chiarelli, MG (USA): pp 4 to 17 (14 pages).

- "U.S. needs to understand Iraqi culture to win war." Athens News Campus Reporter (Jan 17, 2006). Cory Fritz: (2 pages).
- "Changing the Army Counterinsurgency Operations." *Military Review* (Nov-Dec 2005). Nigel Aylwin-Foster: pp. 2 to 15 (14 pages).
- "US Troops Learn about Iraqi Culture Ahead of Deployment." *Voice of America* (August 5, 2005). Al Pessin: (2 pages).
- "Iraq-Bound Marine Leaders Cram on Civics and Economics." *New York Times* (Feb 13, 2006). Eric Schmidt: (2 pages).
- *The Generals' War* (1995): pp.37 to 40, 51 to 52, 72 to 74, 170 to 171, 251 to 261, and 373 (22 pages).

Lesson 7, Information Operations, describes information operations (IO) from the operational level of war. In addition, joint and Marine Corps doctrine, the elements of IO, and IO planning considerations are discussed. It presents key topics and considerations, which will help staff planners integrate IO planning into theater-level plans.

Read:

- MCDP 6, *Command and Control*, 1996, pp. 63 to 71 (9 pages).[1]
- JP 3-13, *Information Operations* (2006): pp. ix to xvi, I-6 to I-10, II-1 to II-10, and V-I to V-8 (32 pages).
- "Information Operations as a Core Competency." *Joint Force Quarterly* (December 2004). Christopher J. Lamb: pp. 88 to 96 (7 pages).
- *The Generals' War*, pp. 110 to 114 (start at POOBAH's PARTY; stop before last paragraph), 121 to 122 (start at next to last paragraph; stop at bottom of page), 180 to 184 (start at THE VIEW FROM BAGHDAD; stop at first paragraph), 317 (start at first paragraph; stop before last paragraph) (13 pages).
- MAGTF Staff Training Program (MSTP) Pamphlet 3-0.4, *Information Operations* (2000): pp. 2 to 3 (2 pages).
- JP 3-13, *Information Operations* (2006): pp. VI-1 to VI-4 (4 pages).

Lesson 8, Conflict Termination and Resolution, introduces two important concepts—conflict termination and conflict resolution—and shows their relationship to each other and the operational level of war. Commanders must plan for conflict termination and the military's role in conflict resolution; thus, this lesson covers planning considerations for conflict termination.

Read:

- JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning* (2006): pp. IV-5 to IV-6 (1 pages).
- MCDP 1-2, *Campaigning* (1997): pp. 50 to 52 (3 pages).
- *Every War Must End*, 2nd ed. (2005). Iklé, Fred Charles: pp. 1 to 16 (16 pages).
- JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning* (2006): pp. III-7 to III-9 (2 pages).
- *The Generals' War* (1995): Chapter 20 and pp. 476 to 477 (30 pages).
- *Every War Must End*, 2nd ed. (2005). Iklé, Fred Charles: pp. xviii to xxii (5 pages).

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[1] This reading was previously assigned in 8901, Lesson 1, Requirement 1.

Course Assessments

Students will be evaluated through three types of assessment activities: 40 points for discussion contribution, 20 points for multiple choice quizzes, and 40 points for the essay final examination—for a total of 100 points. A mastery score of 80 points for the entire course is required to pass.

8904, Joint Warfighting

8904, *Joint Warfighting,* shows the complexities and potential methods involved in joint warfare, which emphasizes unified action and involves synchronizing and integrating joint and/or multinational military operations with the activities of local, state, and other government agencies; intergovernmental organizations; nongovernmental organizations; and elements in the private sector to achieve unity of effort. The main goal of the course is to show the complexities and potential methods involved in joint operations, which emphasizes unified action and involves all players within an area of operations (AO). This approach requires commanders to understand the capabilities, limitations, and mandates of all the organizations involved; and then effectively communicate the mission of the joint force.

Course Composition

Lesson	Study/Prep Time [1]	Contact Time [2]
Lesson 1, Foundations of Joint Warfighting	3.6 hrs	3.0 hrs
Lesson 2, Combatant Commands	4.8 hrs	3.0 hrs
Lesson 3, Joint Functions: Movement and Maneuver, Protection, Command and Control, and Intelligence	3.5 hrs	3.0 hrs
Lesson 4, Joint Mobilization and Sustainment	3.5 hrs	3.0 hrs
Lesson 5, Joint Fires, Information Operations, and Space Operations	4.4 hrs	3.0 hrs
Lesson 6, Interagency Operations	4.0 hrs	3.0 hrs
Lesson 7, Multinational Operations	4.0 hrs	3.0 hrs
Point Paper	2.0 hrs	4.0 hrs
Final Exam	4.0 hrs	4.0 hrs
Total	**33.8 hrs**	**29.0 hrs**

[1] Study and preparation time based on 20 pages of reading per hour.
[2] Contact time is seminar hours plus assessment completion hours.

Course Objectives

Each lesson has specific educational objectives, which have been derived from the following Marine Corps PME ILS Learning Outcomes (found in Enclosure (1)):

Area 1				Area 2					Area 3						Area 4			Area 5			
A	B	C	D	A	B	C	D	E	A	B	C	D	E	F	A	B	C	A	B	C	D
X	X	X	X	X	X			X	X	X	X	X					X				

Course Overview

This course focuses on the organization and employment of joint forces by using recent historical examples, current joint doctrine, and discussions of how joint forces, other government agencies, and international participants interact. Overall, this improves the student's ability to derive operational insights about contemporary operating environments.

Lesson 1, Foundations of Joint Warfighting, provides some joint fundamentals, laying the groundwork for all additional lessons. Topics addressed include: (1) the challenges of the contemporary operating environment; (2) a brief history of Department of Defense (DOD) organization and reform efforts; (3) functions of key players within the DOD; and (4) a broad review of the range of military operations.

Read:

- National Defense Strategy (March 2005): pp. 2 to 3 (2 pages).
- Public Law 99-433, Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (1 Oct 1986): pp. 2 to 4 (3 pages).
- "Conformity Needs Competition." Mackubin Thomas Owens. Armed Forces Journal (June 2006): pp. 24 to 31 (9 pages).
- JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States of America (2007): pp. III-1 to III-12 (11 pages).
- JP 3-0, Joint Operations (2006): pp. V-1 to V-2, VI-1 to VI-2, and VII-1 to VII-2 (5 pages).

View:

- Recorded lecture: "The Goldwater-Nichols Act: An Overview of its Objectives and an Assessment of its Effectiveness." Jim Locher—Senior Staffer on Senate Committee on Armed Services during development of Goldwater-Nichols Act (2006): (38 minutes).

Listen:

- Gen Pace – Views of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Roles of the Chairman, the Combatant Commands, and the Interagency (2007): (20 minutes).

Supplemental Viewing:

- Recorded lecture: "The Joint Staff/TTPs for Higher Level Staff Officers", by BGen J. Dunford, USMC, Vice Director for Operations, Joint Staff J-3, November 2007 (44 minutes).

Lesson 2, Combatant Commands, covers the unique contributions of both the geographic and functional combatant commands, and the authorities of a combatant commander. The student will examine the key documents and publications that provide combatant commanders guidance in their assigned missions and responsibilities. These documents and publications impact the development of all

operational plans, interagency coordination and integration, joint and multinational interoperability, and future acquisition and budget requirements. The assignment and transfer of forces, as well as the responsibilities of functional components, are also addressed.

Read:

- JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States (2007): pp. III-12 to III-15 (4 pages).
- Compilation of excerpts from various Combatant Commander Websites (2006): (21 pages).
- "Breaking the Proconsulate: A New Design for National Power." Mitchell J. Thompson. Parameters (Winter 2005-06): pp. 62 to 75 (12 pages).
- Joint Forces Quarterly (1st Quarter 2009): "Why USAFRICOM?" Edward Marks, pp. 148-151; "U.S. AFRICA COMMAND: Value Added", pp. 152-155; (6 pages).
- JP 4-0, Joint Logistics (2008): pp. V-2 to V-3 (2 pages).
- JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning (2006): pp. I-26 to I-27 (1 page).
- JP 3-30, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations (2003): pp. II-2 to II-3, and II-10 to II-11 (4 pages).
- JP 3-31, Command and Control for Joint Land Operations (2004): pp. II-3 to II-6, and III-1 to III-3 (5 pages).
- JP 3-32, Command and Control for Joint Maritime Operations (2006): pp. I-4 to I-5, and II-3 to II-8 (7 pages).

View:

- Command Video—U.S. European Command (2006): (5 minutes).
- Command Video—U.S. Transportation Command (2006): (15 minutes).

Lesson 3, Joint Functions: Movement and Maneuver, Protection, Command and Control, and Intelligence, introduces the concept of joint functions, which are similar to the Marine Corps warfighting functions. These functions help JFCs integrate, synchronize, and direct joint operations. Some functions, like intelligence and C2, apply to all operations; hence, they are covered in more detail. Other functions do apply, but only as required by the JFCs' missions. Additionally, this lesson provides an overview of information management and assessment.

Read:

- JP 3-0, Joint Operations (2006): pp. III-22 to III-29 (8 pages).
- JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States (2007): pp. IV-15 to IV-20 (5 pages).
- JP 3-0, Joint Operations (2006): pp. III-10 to III-13 (3 pages).
- JP 6-0, Joint Communications System (2006): pp. I-1 to I-11 (11 pages).
- "Doomed to Fail: America's Blind Faith in Military Technology' (selected excerpts). John A. Gentry. Parameters (Winter 2002-03): pp. 88 to 103 (9 pages).
- JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence (2007): pp. III-1 to III-17 (17 pages).
- JP 3-0, Joint Operations (2006): pp. IV-30 to IV-34 (4 pages)

View:

- "JTF Command and Control" (Topic 1). JTF-101: JTF Command and Control Considerations (Module 3) (2006). Joint Knowledge Development and Distribution Capability (JKDDC) Learning Resource Website: pp. 4 to 11 (4 minutes).
- "JTF Intelligence Considerations and Best Practices" (Topic 5). JTF-101: Joint Intelligence (Module 13)(2006). Joint Knowledge Development and Distribution Capability (JKDDC) Learning Resource Website: pp. 2 to 4 (2 minutes).

Lesson 4, Joint Mobilization and Sustainment, presents an overview on the total force before delving into the tenets, levels and resource areas of mobilization. This lesson also introduces sustainment considerations at the different levels of war, focusing on the theater strategic and operational level.

Read:

- JP 4-05, Joint Mobilization Planning (2006): pp. IV-2 to IV-5 (4 pages).
- JP 4-05, Joint Mobilization Planning (2006): pp. IV-8 to IV-31 (24 pages).
- JP 4-0, Joint Logistics (2008): pp. I-4 to I-10 and V-5 to V-12 (12 pages).
- JP 3-35, Joint Deployment and Redeployment Operations (2007): pp. VI-1 to VI-9 (8 pages).

View:

- "Common User Logistics and Joint Logistics Challenges" (Topic 2). JTF-101: Joint Logistics (Module 7)(2006). Joint Knowledge Development and Distribution Capability (JKDDC) Learning Resource Website: pp.1 to 7 (13 minutes).

Supplemental Viewing:

- "Joint Logistics Functions" (Topic 1). JTF-101: Joint Logistics (Module 7) (2006). JKDDC Learning Resource Website: pp.3 to 13 (9 minutes).

Lesson 5, Joint Fires, Information Operations, and Space Operations, distinguishes between joint fires, joint fire support, and fire support systems. It also defines and reviews significant aspects of interdiction, the joint targeting coordination board, and the joint air tasking cycle. IO integration in joint operations is covered, too, specifically emphasizing IO's focus on effects and the relationship with the joint targeting process. The role of space systems, planning considerations, and command relationships for space operations are also addressed.

Read:

- JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support (2006): pp. I-2, I-3, I-6, II-3, and III-15 to III-21 (8 pages).
- JP 3-30, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations (2003): pp. III-20 to III-27 (8 pages).

- "Effects-Based Operations in Afghanistan: The CJTF-180 Method of Orchestrating Effects to Achieve Objectives." MAJ Robert B. Herndon, CWO3 John A. Robinson, COL James L. Creighton, LTC Raphael Torres, and MAJ Louis J. Bello. Field Artillery Journal (January-February 2004): pp. 26 to 30 (5 pages).
- "Massing Effects in the Information Domain: A Case Study in Aggressive Information Operations" (selected excerpts). LTG Thomas F. Metz. Military Review (May-June 2006): pp. 105 to 113 (8 pages).
- JP 3-14, Joint Doctrine for Space Operations, (2009), Excerpts from Appendices A, D, and E (14 pages).
- "Space Operations" by William L. Shelton. Joint Forces Quarterly 46 (3d quarter 2007): pp. 62-63 (2 pages).
- "Space Warriors" by Scott R. Gourley. Military Geospatial Technology, Vol. 2:2, (22 July 2004) (4 pages).

View:

- JTF-101 Joint Fires and Targeting (Module 9) (2006) (specific topics follow). Joint Knowledge Development and Distribution Capability (JKDDC) Learning Resource Website:

  Topic 2: "Synchronization of Joint Fires": pp. 1 to 5 (5 minutes).
  Topic 3: "Joint Targeting Cycle": pp. 1 to 31 (25 minutes).
  Topic 4: "Fires and Targeting Organizations": pp. 1 to 15 (8 minutes).

Supplemental Reading:

- "2008 Space Almanac" by Tamar A. Mehuron. AIR FORCE magazine (August 2008): pp. 34-53 (15 pages).

Lesson 6, Interagency Operations, discusses operational integration of various agencies and organizations external to the DOD, with the main focus on understanding other agencies' cultures, so they can work together towards operational objectives. This lesson also discusses the functions, boundaries, and organization of the joint interagency coordination group (JIACG), highlighting the dynamics involved in working with disparate entities.

Read:

- "Crossing Boundaries: Interagency Cooperation in the Military." Patrick N. Kelleher. Joint Forces Quarterly 32 (Autumn 2002): pp. 104 to 110 (7 pages).
- "Interagency Capabilities." Jonas L. Blank and L. Erik Kjonerrod. Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations (2004). Hans Binnendijk and Stuart Johnson (eds.): pp. 107 to 113 (7 pages).
- "Interagency Lessons Learned in Afghanistan." Tucker B. Mansager. Joint Forces Quarterly 40 (1st quarter 2006): pp. 80 to 84 (5 pages).
- JP 3-08, Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations Vol. II (2006): pp. iii, A-1, A-M-1 to A-M-5, B-2, C-1 (7 pages).

- JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations (2008): pp.II-26 to II-33 (7 pages).
- "Joint Interagency Cooperation: The First Step." Mathew F. Bogdanos. Joint Forces Quarterly 37 (Spring 2005): pp. 10 to 18 (9 pages).

Scan:

- JP 3-08, Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations Vol. I (2006): pp. I-1 to I-5, and II- 17 to II-27 (15 pages).

View:

- "Civil Military Operations: Working with NGOs." American Council for Voluntary International Action: (38 minutes).

Lesson 7, Multinational Operations, addresses why U.S. forces operate within the framework of alliances and coalitions, the tenets of cooperation, and the significance of achieving unity of effort in multinational operations. Multinational planning considerations, C2, and command structure are also reviewed. Finally, considerations for the following differences within alliances and coalitions are discussed: culture, doctrine, training, equipment, language, intelligence, logistics, and rules of engagement.

Read:

- "Command and Control: The Essence of Coalition Warfare." Colonel Anthony J. Rice. Parameters (Spring 1997): pp. 152 to 167 (15 pages).
- "Non-Traditional Military Missions." Major General Anthony C. Zinni. Perspectives On Warfighting (6)—Capital "W" War: A Case for Strategic Principles of War (1988). Dr. Joe Strange: pp. 262 to 266 (4 pages).
- JP 3-16, Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations (2007): pp. III-1 to III-19, III-27 to III-38, and III-40 to III-42 (30 pages).
- "Operation Allied Force: Lessons for Future Coalition Operations." Rand Research Brief-72-AF (2001): pp. 1 to 5 (4 pages).

View:

- "Advantages and Challenges of Multinational Operations" (Topic 3). JTF-101: Multinational Operations (Module 12)(2006). Joint Knowledge Development and Distribution Capability (JKDDC) Learning Resource Website: pp. 1 to 17 (19 minutes).

Course Assessments

Students will be evaluated through 4 types of assessment activities: 10 point for a point paper, 20 points for short multiple-choice quizzes, 30 points for an essay based final examination, and 40 points for discussion contribution (in either onsite or online seminar venues)—for a total of 100 points. A mastery score of 80 points for the entire course is required to pass.

8905, Small Wars

8905, *Small Wars*, provides a foundation for analyzing and applying the doctrine and lessons learned from past small wars to the small war environments of the 21st century. The effects of modern technology and economic globalization have made the world a "smaller" place, so events that occur in remote parts of the world can have significant impacts upon both U.S. national security and U.S. economic well-being.

Students will apply analytical thought to various characteristics of small wars and conduct a structured study of several different small war environments—humanitarian assistance, peace operations, counterinsurgency, and stability operations. The primary goal of this course is to improve the student's knowledge of small war environments and ability to contribute to the planning and execution of small wars missions.

Course Composition

Lesson	Study/Prep Time [1]	Contact Time [2]
Lesson 1, The Nature of Small Wars	4.0 hrs	3.0 hrs
Lesson 2, Culture in Small Wars	4.0 hrs	3.0 hrs
Lesson 3, Ethics in Small Wars	4.5 hrs	3.0 hrs
Lesson 4, Humanitarian Assistance	5.0 hrs	3.0 hrs
Lesson 5, Peace Operations	4.6 hrs	3.0 hrs
Lesson 6, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency	5.6 hrs	3.0 hrs
Lesson 7, Stability Operations	3.0 hrs	3.0 hrs
Lesson 8, Transnational Threats and the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT)	4.6 hrs	3.0 hrs
Final Exam	4.0 hrs	4.0 hrs
Total	**39.3 hrs**	**28.0 hrs**

[1]   Study and preparation time based on 20 pages of reading per hour.
[2]   Contact time is seminar hours plus assessment completion hours.

Course Objectives

Each lesson has specific educational objectives, which have been derived from the following Marine Corps PME ILS Learning Outcomes (found in Enclosure (1)):

Area 1				Area 2					Area 3						Area 4			Area 5			
A	B	C	D	A	B	C	D	E	A	B	C	D	E	F	A	B	C	A	B	C	D
X	X	X	X				X	X	X	X		X			X		X	X			

Course Overview

8905, *Small Wars,* provides a foundation for analyzing and applying the doctrine and lessons learned from past small wars to the small war environments of the 21st century. Students will apply analytical thought to various characteristics of small wars and conduct a more structured study of several different small war environments—humanitarian assistance, peace operations, counterinsurgency, and stability operations. The primary goal of this course is to improve the student's knowledge of small war environments and ability to contribute to the planning and execution of small wars missions.

Lesson 1, The Nature of Small Wars, introduces the operational environment of the various small wars missions typically assigned to the U.S armed forces. Small wars—known variously as operations other than war, low intensity conflicts, irregular warfare, and unconventional warfare—encompass a variety of military operations that fall short of major war (e.g., a show of force, foreign internal defense, or combating an insurgency). Students must understand the complexities of these various operations, and then adapt and apply the lessons learned and codified from previous small war experiences to current and future small wars. These environments are addressed from both the Marine Corps and joint perspectives. Additionally, this lesson introduces the Philippine War case study, which is intertwined in several of the course lessons.

Read:

- "Small Wars Revisited: The United States and Nontraditional Wars." Frank G. Hoffman. *The Journal of Strategic Studies* (December 2005): pp. 914 to 934 (20 pages).
- FMFRP 12-15, *Small Wars Manual* (1987) (reprint of 1940 edition). Department of the Navy: pp. 1 to 16 (15 pages).
- JP 3-0, *Joint Operations* (2006): pp. VI-1 to VI-17 and pp. VII-1 to VII-11 (28 pages).
- *The Army and Irregular Warfare* (last updated 2002). John M. Gates. (4 December 2006): Chapter 3 (8 pages).

Lesson 2, Culture in Small Wars, covers the importance of cultural awareness in a small wars environment. It describes both U.S. and foreign ways of thought and behavior, providing insight into culture at all levels of war. Military leaders must integrate cultural considerations into all aspects of warfighting. The study of culture, both foreign cultures and U.S. culture, allows the student to better appreciate the impact that culture has in small wars. This lesson also discusses cultural factors that should be considered during operational planning. Finally, cultural factors are analyzed using the Philippine War case study to illustrate the importance of these factors in small wars.

Read:

- "Culture Shock: Overhauling the Mentality of the Military." LtCol James B. Higgins. *Marine Corps Gazette* (Feb 2006): pp. 48 to 50 (3 pages).

- Through the Lens of Cultural Awareness: A Primer for US Armed Forces Deploying to Arab and Middle Eastern Countries (2006). LTC William D. Wunderle, U.S. Army: pp. 9 to 19 (11 pages).
- "The American Way of War - Cultural Barriers to Successful Counterinsurgency." Policy Analysis No. 577. Jeffrey Record. The CATO Institute online (September 2006): pp. 1 to 17 (17 pages).
- "Marines Are From Mars, Iraqis Are From Venus." Major Ben Connable, First Marine Division G-2. TECOM CAOCL Article (30 May 2004): (4 pages).
- Through the Lens of Cultural Awareness: A Primer for US Armed Forces Deploying to Arab and Middle Eastern Countries (2006). LTC William D. Wunderle, U.S. Army: pp. 57 to 62 and pp. 71 to 82 (18 pages).
- FM 34-130, *Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield* (8 July 1994): pp. 6-1 to 6-19 (14 pages).
- "U.S. Counterinsurgency in Iraq: Lessons from the Philippine War." Tom Donnelly and Vance Serchuk. American Enterprise Institute's Online *National Security Outlook* (November 2003): (8 pages).

Lesson 3, Ethics in Small Wars, presents an overview of just war theory and how this theory evolved. The basic premise of just war theory is that some wars are just, while others are unjust. The lesson discusses the two separate and distinct components of just war theory—*jus ad bellum* (the reasons for going to war) and *jus in bello* (how a war is conducted). This is followed by a discussion of the Law of War and the ethical responsibilities of U.S. forces operating in small wars environments as well as during major wars.

Read:

- MCDP 1-1, *Strategy* (1997): pp. 93 to 95 (2 pages).
- "Restraint in War." LtCol Lance A. McDaniel. *Marine Corps Gazette* "Web Extra" (November 2006): (5 pages).
- "The Evolution of the Just War Tradition: Defining *Jus Post Bellum*" (extract). Major Richard P. DiMeglio. *Military Law Review* (Winter 2005): pp. 131 to 146 (15 pages).
- The Triumph of Just War Theory (and the Dangers of Success) (2002). Michael Walzer: transcribed lecture (16 pages).
- "Basic Principles of the Law of War." CLAMO and HQMC JA (JAO). *Marine Corps Gazette* (October 2002): pp. 36 to 37 (2 pages).
- "Proportionality in the Law of War." Major Gregory G. Gillette. *Marine Corps Gazette* (September 2003): pp. 60 to 62 (3 pages).
- "Ethics and Combat." Steven M. Silver. *Marine Corps Gazette* (November 2006): pp. 76 to 78 (3 pages).
- "Rescuing the Law of War: A Way Forward in an Era of Global Terrorism." Michael H. Hoffman. *Parameters* (Summer 2005): pp. 18 to 35 (16 pages).
- Ethical Challenges in Contemporary Conflict: The Afghanistan and Iraq Cases (2004). LtGen James N. Mattis: transcribed lecture (25 pages).

Lesson 4, Humanitarian Assistance, introduces humanitarian assistance operations and the importance of interagency coordination and collaboration during operations.

The student will examine the U.S. military capabilities (e.g., logistics, mobility, communications) which can be vital for foreign humanitarian assistance operations or military support to civil authorities in domestic emergencies. Additionally, they will evaluate the debate within the DOD regarding budgetary matters relating to humanitarian operations, as well as the degree to which these missions detract from the primary warfighting mission of the U.S. armed forces. Finally, a short case study is discussed to illustrate the complexity of these type operations.

Read:

- JP 3-07.6, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (2001): pp. I-1 to I-10 (10 pages).
- Emerald Express 06-1 (EE 06-1) Military Support in Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief: Assessment Report Insights and Observations: pp.1-23 (23 pages).
- JP 3-07.6, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance: pp. IV-1 to IV-36 (36 pages).
- *National Incident Management System* (NIMS) (1 March 2004): pp. 7 to 28 (22 pages).
- "Humanity on Humanitarian Operations: How Much Violence Is Enough?" LtCol John R. Allen, USMC. *Marine Corps Gazette* (February 1995): pp. 14 to 21 (7 pages).

Listen:

- Interview with BGen John R. Allen on his current perspectives on Humanitarian Assistance Operations (Taped January 2007): (34 minutes).

Lesson 5, Peace Operations, covers the joint doctrine for the various types of peace operations—peacekeeping, peace enforcement, peacemaking, peace building, and conflict prevention. Peace operations are important because while many modern conflicts and crises do not directly threaten U.S. national **security**, they may affect U.S. national **interests**: access to markets and materials, the safety of U.S. citizens abroad, humanitarian crisis, or the stability of democratic governments. Also, a comparison of two prior peace operations is conducted to analyze some of the factors that impact peace operations.

Read:

- Excerpt from (Draft) JP 3-07.3, *Peace Operations* (June 2006) (Revision Final Coordination): (25 pages).
- MCWP 3-33.8 *Peace Ops* (October 2003): pp. II-1 to III-16 (27 pages).
- "UNAMIR: Mission to Rwanda." R. A. Dallaire and B. Poulin. *Joint Forces Quarterly* (Spring 1995): pp. 66 to 71 (6 pages).
- "Multinational Forces and United Nations Operations." Dr. Alan Ryan, Land Warfare Studies Center, Australian Capital Territory: (14 pages).
- "A New Way to Wage Peace: U.S. Support to Operation *Stabilise*." Major Craig A. Collier. *Military Review* (Jan/Feb 2001): pp. 2 to 9 (8 pages).

View:

- "The Last Just Man" (edited video). *Turning Points of History* (2002). Sundance Channel: (43 min).

Lesson 6, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency, discusses the characteristics of insurgency and counterinsurgency, defines the aspects of insurgency and counterinsurgency, and explains the theories and operating concepts that can effectively combat an insurgency. The student is introduced to lessons learned from previous and contemporary COIN operations, as well as interim and recently developed doctrine. It also considers the Marine Corps' operational approach to counterinsurgency and some political and legal considerations for counterinsurgencies. Finally, the Philippine War case study is discussed with respect to U.S. counterinsurgency operations during that conflict. This historical case study looks at the challenges that define counterinsurgency operations.

Read:

- MCWP 3-33.5, *Counterinsurgency* (15 December 2006): Chapter 1 (29 pages).
- *Countering Irregular Threats: A Comprehensive Approach* (14 June 2006). Marine Corps Combat Development Command: pp. 1 to 15 (14 pages).
- "The Fall of the Warrior King." Dexter Filkins. *The New York Times Magazine* (23 October 2005): (18 pages).
- "Other War": Lessons from Five Decades of RAND Counterinsurgency Research (2006, RAND Corporation). Austin Long: pp. 21 to 33 (13 pages).
- *The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power* (2002). Max Boot (New York: Basic Books): pp. 109 to 128 (19 pages).

View:

- Counterinsurgency Seminar 07 (CS 07), Dr. David Kilcullen, Small Wars Center of Excellence, Wargaming Division, Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, Quantico, Virginia (2007) (1 hour).

Lesson 7, Stability Operations, describes stability operations and some of the factors that impact the conduct of the operations. Stability operations are complex civil-military endeavors in which the U.S. military has a long history and has always played an important role. The objective of stability operations is to establish governance that enables a country or regime to provide for its own security, rule of law, social services, and economic activity; and eliminate as many of the root causes of the crisis as possible to establish long-term stability while reducing the likelihood of a future crisis. Students examine interagency coordination during stability operations and legal issues that arise during these operations.

Read:

- "Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations: Issues of US Military Involvement." Congressional Research Service: Issue Brief for Congress (May 2006). Nina M. Serafino: pp. CSR-1 to CSR-6 (6 pages).

- "Stability Operations in Strategic Perspective: A Skeptical View." Colin S. Gray. *Parameters* (Summer 2006): pp. 4 to 14 (10 pages).
- National Security Presidential Directive-44, "Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization" (7 Dec 2005): pp. 1 to 6 (5 pages).
- Department of Defense Directive 3000.05, "Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations" (28 Nov 2005): pp. 1 to 11 (11 pages).
- JP 3-08, Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations, Vol I (2006): pp. I-1 to I-6 (5 pages).
- "Waging Peace: Operations Eclipse I and II—Some Implications for Future Operations." LtCol. Kenneth O. McCreedy, USA. U.S. Army War College Research Project (2004): pp. 1 to 14 (14 pages).
- "Creating a Force for Peace Operations: Ensuring Stability with Justice." Kimberly C. Field and Robert M. Perito. *Parameters* (Winter 2002-03): pp. 77 to 87 (10 pages).

Lesson 8, Transnational Threats and the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), defines transnational threats and their implications on world stability, along with an overview of the primary transnational threats to U.S. security. These threats fall outside the traditional view of national security that focused on potential hostilities with other nation-states. The student will study the broad definition of transnational threats to foster a greater understanding of this dynamic phenomenon, and what it potentially means to the U.S. National Security Strategy. Then, they will take a more focused look at a current transnational threat that garners the majority of the United States' attention and efforts: the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). Additionally, terrorism, and the U.S. global strategy to "defeat" those elements that employ it, are discussed.

Read:

- "The Advent of Netwar (Revisited)" excerpt. *Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy* (2001). John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt (eds.). Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp. (14 pages).
- The Princeton Project on National Security: The Report of the Working Group on State Security and Transnational Threats (September 2006). Peter Bergen and Laurie Garrett (Co-Chairs): pp. 1-20 (20 pages).
- *Defeating Terrorism: Strategic Issue Analyses* (2002). John Martin (ed.). Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College: pp. 1-12 (11 pages).
- "Knowing the Enemy." George Packer. *The New Yorker*, (18 December 2006): pp. 60 to 69 (9 pages).
- National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (September 2006): pp. 1-23 (17 pages).
- "The Foundation of the New Terrorism." The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, authorized (first) edition: pp. 47 to 70 (24 pages).
- *Militant Ideology Atlas* (Executive Report) (November 2006): pp. 4 to 12 (9 pages).

Course Assessments

Students will be evaluated through three types of assessment activities: 40 points for discussion contribution, 20 points for multiple choice quizzes, and 40 points for the essay final examination—for a total of 100 points. A mastery score of 80 points for the entire course is required to pass.

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8906, MAGTF Expeditionary Operations

8906, *MAGTF Expeditionary Operations,* focuses on Marine Corps warfighting concepts and organization, as well as how MAGTF operations are conducted, to provide an understanding of how Marines contribute to joint operations. This course ensures that Marine officers have an intimate knowledge of the following fundamentals:

- MAGTF types and organization.
- Operational concepts.
- The single-battle concept.
- Force deployment planning and execution.

The course also covers logistics, command and control (C2), leadership and ethics, intelligence, MAGTF fire support, and irregular/counterinsurgency warfare.

Course Composition

Lesson	Study/Prep Time [1]	Contact Time [2]
Lesson 1, Leadership and Ethics	3.1 hrs	3.0 hrs
Lesson 2, Expeditionary Operations and Concepts	2.6 hrs	3.0 hrs
Lesson 3, The Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF)	3.2 hrs	3.0 hrs
Lesson 4, Offensive and Defensive Operations	4.0 hrs	3.0 hrs
Lesson 5, Rear Area Operations and Force Protection	3.7 hrs	3.0 hrs
Lesson 6, Force Deployment Planning and Execution and the Maritime Preposition Force	3.7 hrs	3.0 hrs
Lesson 7, Logistics Support for Expeditionary Operations	4.1 hrs	3.0 hrs
Lesson 8, Command and Control and Intelligence	3.1 hrs	3.0 hrs
Lesson 9, MAGTF Fires and Information Operations (IO)	4.3 hrs	3.0 hrs
Philosophy of Command Paper	4.0 hrs	4.0 hrs
Final Exam	4.0 hrs	4.0 hrs
Total	**39.8 hrs**	**35.0 hrs**

[1] Study and preparation time based on 20 pages of reading per hour.
[2] Contact time is seminar hours plus assessment completion hours.

Course Objectives

Each lesson has specific educational objectives, which have been derived from the following Marine Corps PME ILS Learning Outcomes (found in Enclosure (1)):

Area 1				Area 2					Area 3						Area 4			Area 5			
A	B	C	D	A	B	C	D	E	A	B	C	D	E	F	A	B	C	A	B	C	D
		X		X			X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X			X	X	X	X

Course Overview

MAGTF Expeditionary Operations covers Expeditionary Operations, MAGTF's, Irregular Warfare, warfighting functions, and leadership principles. It uses a Korean War Case Study, theories, and current/contemporary doctrine to improve the students' ability to derive operational and tactical insights from any situation; and exercise judgment to achieve success, on the battlefield or during staff actions.

Lesson 1, Leadership and Ethics, provides an overview of Marine Corps leadership and ethics. It goes further, though, exposing insightful U.S. military laws and ethics, as well as their obligations: the leadership development responsibilities at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. Specific leadership and ethical characteristics for irregular warfare are covered too—for instance, effective negotiating skills, dealing with the media, and Combat Operational Stress Reaction coping skills.

Read:

- MCDP 6, *Command and Control* (4 October 1996): pp. 82 to 84 (3 pages), and pp. 122 to 123 (2 pages).
- MCDP 1, *Warfighting* (20 June 1997): pp. 13 to 17 (5 pages).
- MCRP 6-11D, *Sustaining the Transformation* (28 June 1999): pp. 17 to 19 (4 pages).
- JP 1, *Joint Warfare* (14 November 2000): pp. III-3 to III-7 (5 pages).
- MCDP 1, *Warfighting* (20 June 1997): pp. 77 to 81 (5 pages).
- FM 3-24/FMFM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency* (15 December 2006): pp. 7-1 to 7-9 (9 pages).
- MCRP X-XX, CITO/Multi-Service Techniques, and Procedures for the Cultural Impact on Tactical Operations (Final Coordinating Draft) (November 2006): pp. 34 to 36 (3 pages).
- JP 3-61, *Public Affairs* (9 May 2005): pp. B-1 to B-3 (3 pages).
- FM 4-02.51, *Combat and Operational Stress Control* (6 July 2006): pp. 1-4 to 1-6 (3 pages), 6-1 to 6-5 (5 pages).

View:

- Command and Staff College Negotiation Exercise (27 minutes).

Lesson 2, Expeditionary Operations and Concepts, examines the concepts that define the Marine Corps' vision and articulates the strategies for future development and operations. The concepts in this lesson will empower Marine leaders who conduct expeditionary operations; and individuals, outside of the USMC, who must understand Marine Corps capabilities and operating concepts for effective employment in their

respective Services. In addition, definitions and comparisons of conventional and irregular war are embedded within the concept Countering Irregular Threats. Later lessons provide a comprehensive examination of irregular war, as it applies to MAGTF expeditionary operations.

Read:

- MCDP 3, *Expeditionary Operations* (April 1998): pp. 31 to 36 (6 pages).
- ALMAR 018/05 "33rd Commandant of the Marine Corps Updated Guidance (The 21st Century Marine Corps—Creating Stability in an Unstable World)": (2 pages).
- "Marine Corps Operating Concepts for a Changing Security Environment" (March 2006): pp. 43 to 51, pp. 53 to 71, pp. 97 to 102 (32 pages).

Lesson 3, The Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF), introduces the basic structure all Marine Corps operational forces are organized around: MAGTFs. They are task-organized forces made up of four elements—a command element (CE), an aviation combat element (ACE), a ground combat element (GCE), and a logistics combat element (LCE)—which combine versatile capabilities to create a balanced, flexible, responsive, self-sustaining force. As a result, combatant commanders have a potent, fast reacting, all-purpose expeditionary force capable of many different missions. This lesson also discusses how MAGTF commanders command and control their MAGTFs; how they accomplish missions; and how irregular warfare associates with the single-battle concept, the main effort, and supporting efforts.

Read:

- Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 1-0, *Marine Corps Operations* (1997): pp. 3-10 to 3-20 (9 pages).
- MCDP 1-0, *Marine Corps Operations*: pp. 4-3 to 4-7 and 6-20 to 6-24 (8 pages).
- "Fighting the Single Battle." *Marine Corps Gazette* (Aug 2001). MSTP Staff: pp. 27 to 28 (2 pages).
- "Is There a Deep Fight in a Counterinsurgency?" *Military Review* (July-August 2005). Major Lee K. Grubbs and Major Michael J. Forsyth, USA: pp. 28 to 31 (4 pages).
- MCDP 1-0, *Marine Corps Operations*: pp. 6-17 to 6-19 and 6-24 to 6-28 (8 pages).
- "Operational Design." *Marine Corps Gazette* (June 2001). MSTP Staff: pp. 36 to 38 (3 pages).
- "Main and Supporting Efforts." *Marine Corps Gazette* (December 2001). MSTP Staff: pp. 32 to 35 (4 pages).

Listen:

- "Fighting the MAGTF" Interview with LtGen James T. Conway: (31 minutes).

Lesson 4, Offensive and Defensive Operations, discusses these applications (in MAGTF operations) during conventional and irregular warfare. Offense and defense are two completely interrelated components of warfare, and both have functions in

decisive victories—even though both are focused on the same goal, they achieve different results. A Korean War Case Study reinforces this lesson's content, primarily focusing on large unit offensive and defensive operations. But instances of unconventional and "irregular" operations, which heavily influenced UN and communist forces during the Korean conflict, are also highlighted. This lesson also illustrates and reinforces the single-battle concept which all commanders must fully grasp during the CSCDEP 8900 course series.

Read:

- MCDP 1-0, *Marine Corps Operations* (27 September 2001): pp. 8-1 to 8-22 (22 pages).
- "Korean War: Inchon Case Study Prelude." Gene Grayson (7 pages).

View:

- *Defensive Operations Korea Case Study: Pusan, Korea.* Interactive multimedia element (IME) (30 minutes).

Lesson 5, Rear Area Operations and Force Protection, summarizes rear area operations, and who plans and executes them. Additionally, the new joint doctrine of joint security operations (JSO), contained in JP 3-10, is introduced; providing a starting point for understanding the latest joint doctrine in this critical area. Because rear areas are vulnerable, force protection is now a critical priority to commanders at all levels. Today's asymmetrical environment poses threats that require tremendous imagination, creativity, innovation, and vigilance to overcome. This lesson explores an integral piece of the MEF and MAGTF single-battle concept, which is not normally focused on during aggressive, offensive operations.

Read:

- MCWP 3-41.1, *Rear Area Operations* (20 July 2000): pp. 2-9 to 2-13 and pp. 4-1 to 4-17 (22 pages).
- "The Rear Area as Part of the Commander's Single Battle." *Marine Corps Gazette* (September 2001). MSTP Staff: pp. 44-48 (3 pages).
- Joint Pub 3-10, *Joint Security Operations in Theater* (30 November 2005): pp. vii to xiii and I-1 to I-7 and pp. II-1 to II-12 (19 pages).
- Joint Pub 3-07.2, *Antiterrorism* (14 April 2006): Appendix H, pp. H-1 to H-7 (7 pages).
- "Force Protection in Urban and Unconventional Environments." Defense Science Board Task Force: Summary of Findings and Recommendations (March 2006): pp. iii-xi (8 pages).
- "Force Protection Lessons from Iraq." *Joint Forces Quarterly* (2nd Quarter 2005). Phillip G. Pattee: pp. 65-71 (7 pages).
- "The Antiterrorism/Force Protection Battlespace is Six Inches Wide." *The Guardian* (January 2004). LTC Chip Cutler, USA (J34, The Joint Staff): pp. 15 to 18 (4 pages).

Lesson 6, Force Deployment Planning and Execution and the Maritime Preposition Force, provides a foundational knowledge base of procedures, variables, and complexities involved in joint force and MAGTF deployment. This lesson connects deployment planning with employment planning; explains the time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) process; introduces deployment terminology and concepts; shows a TPFDD, and demonstrates how it is used (from a supervisory perspective). Additionally, deployment planning and execution considerations for maritime preposition force (MPF) operations are introduced and examined.

Read:

- *The Generals' War.* Michael Gordon and Bernard Trainor. Chapter 3, pp. 54 to 66 (13 pages).
- JP 3-35, *Joint Deployment and Redeployment Operations* (7 September 1999): pp. I-10 to I-22 (13 pages).
- MCWP 3-32, *Maritime Prepositioning Force Operations* (23 February 2004): pp. 1-1 to 1-5 and 15-1 to 15-3 (8 pages).

View:

- "Sea Basing: A Case Study of Past and Future MPF Operations." Marine Corps Combat Development Command Video: (11 minutes).

Lesson 7, Logistics Support for Expeditionary Operations, provides a basic understanding of logistics support for expeditionary operations at the operational and tactical levels of war, and provides an overview of logistics planning considerations. The ability of MAGTFs to conduct expeditionary operations is a vital element of the U.S. concept of power projection. In order to project and sustain MAGTFs, logistics planning must be thoroughly conducted and tied to the overall concept of operations. This lesson also shows how logistics organizations and logistics combat elements (LCEs) provide operational and tactical level support to MAGTFs.

Read:

- MCWP 4-12, *Operational-Level Logistics* (30 January 2002): pp. 1-1 to 1-7 (7 pages).
- MCWP 4-11, *Tactical-Level Logistics* (13 June 2000): pp. 1-3 to 1-9 (7 pages).
- MCWP 4-12, *Operational-Level Logistics* (30 January 2002): pp. 5-1 to 5-12 and pp. A-1 to A-4 (15 pages).
- MCWP 4-11, *Tactical-Level Logistics* (13 June 2000): pp. A-1 to A-3 (3 pages).
- "MLC: Sustaining Tempo on the 21st Century Battlefield." *Marine Corps Gazette* (August 2003). BGen Michael R. Lehnert and Col John E. Wissler: pp. 30 to 33 (4 pages).
- "Logistics Support to 1st Marine Division During Operation IRAQI FREEDOM." *Marine Corps Gazette* (August 2003). LtCol John J. Broadmeadow: pp. 44 to 45 (2 pages).
- MCWP 4-12, *Operational-Level Logistics* (30 January 2002): pp. 4-1 to 4-10 (10 pages).

- MCWP 4-11, *Tactical-Level Logistics* (13 June 2000): pp. 4-4 (start at Concept of Logistic Support) to 4-14 (11 pages).

Listen:

- "Providing Expeditionary Warfare Logistics Support in Irregular Warfare and Revamping FSSG." Interview with LtGen Richard Kramlich, August 2006: (22 minutes).

Lesson 8, Command and Control and Intelligence, explains C2 and intelligence support in planning and conducting expeditionary operations. MAGTF C2 structures permit commanders at all levels to coordinate, synchronize, and employ forces, while maintaining the situational awareness to adjust to changing battlespace circumstances. MAGTF intelligence support, which commanders and staffs use to develop plans, is also discussed. Intelligence provides detailed analysis of enemy capabilities and characteristics, as well as vital information about the environment. Knowing how these warfighting functions are applied, in conjunction with other functions, will assist leaders and staffs in planning and conducting expeditionary operations.

Read:

- MCWP 3-40.1, *MAGTF Command and Control* (17 Mar 2003): pp. 1-1 to 1-3, pp. 7-1 to 7-14 (17 pages).
- MajGen Keith Stalder Statement to the House Armed Services Committee Concerning I MEF C4I during Operation Iraqi Freedom (21 Oct 2003): (8 pages).
- MCWP 2-1, *Intelligence Operations* (10 September 2003): pp. 1-1 to 1-10, pp. 5-1 to 5-5 (15 pages).
- "What Is an Intelligence Failure? A Case Study of Korea, 1950." *Marine Corps Gazette* (October 1997). Maj John F. Schmitt: pp. 60 to 65 (6 pages).
- "Blue Diamond Intelligence: Division-Level Intelligence Operations during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM." *Marine Corps Gazette* (February 2004). LtCol Michael S. Groen: pp. 22 to 25 (4 pages).
- *Defeating Communist Insurgency* (1966). Sir Robert Thompson. Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, New York: pp. 84 to 89 (5 pages).

Lesson 9, MAGTF Fires and Information Operations (IO), demonstrates how MAGTF commanders use fires and IO to accomplish their missions. MAGTFs are, first and foremost, combined arms forces, and their combat success depends on the commanders' ability to synchronize the striking power of fires and IO with maneuver and sustainment. This lesson also discusses MAGTF fires, joint fires, joint targeting, and the role of MAGTF commanders in planning and conducting fires. It also addresses how MAGTF commanders employ IO during irregular warfare (e.g., an insurgency) to achieve desired effects on the enemy, while winning and maintaining the support of the people.

Read:

- Joint Pub 3-09, *Doctrine for Joint Fire Support* (12 May 1998): pp. I-1 to I-3, I-6 to I-7 (4 pages). (This is a duplicate reading from 8904, lesson 5).

- MCDP 1-0, *Marine Corps Operations* (27 Sep 2001): pp. A-2 to A-3 (2 pages).
- Joint Pub 3-09, *Doctrine for Joint Fire Support* (12 May 1998): pp. III-2 to III-7 (5 pages).
- Joint Pub 3-09, *Doctrine for Joint Fire Support* (12 May 1998): pp. A-1 to A-10 (10 pages).
- MCWP 3-40.4, *MAGTF Information Operations* (9 July 2003): pp. 1-2 to 1-8; 2-1 to 2-4; 3-1 to 3-10 (19 pages).
- *Defeating Communist Insurgency* (1966). Sir Robert Thompson. Frederick A. Praeger Publishers: pp. 90 to 102 (12 pages).

Course Assessments

Students will be evaluated through four types of assessment activities: 30 points for discussion contribution, 20 points for multiple-choice quizzes, 20 points for the Philosophy of Command Paper, and 30 points for the essay examination—for a total of 100 points. The final week of the course will be used to administer the final essay examination. A mastery score of 80 points for the entire course is required to pass.

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8907, Amphibious Operations

8907, *Amphibious Operations,* is designed to enable the student to become competent and confident enough to plan for amphibious operations. The course explores the interactions that occur between planners of different staffs, identifies amphibious planning considerations, and explains the amphibious planning process. Gaining proficiency and a detailed understanding of amphibious operations allows the student to apply and analyze the ideas presented in 8906, MAGTF Expeditionary Operations, to amphibious operations.

Course Composition

Lesson	Study/Prep Time [1]	Contact Time [2]
Lesson 1, Concepts and Organization	3.2 hrs	3.0 hrs
Lesson 2, Amphibious Planning	3.6 hrs	3.0 hrs
Lesson 3, Amphibious Fires and Logistics	4.0 hrs	3.0 hrs
Lesson 4, Anti-Access	2.0 hrs	3.0 hrs
Final Exam	4.0 hrs	4.0 hrs
Total	**17.2 hrs**	**16.0 hrs**

[1]   Study and preparation time based on 20 pages of reading per hour.
[2]   Contact time is seminar hours plus assessment completion hours.

Course Objectives

Each lesson has specific educational objectives, which have been derived from the following Marine Corps PME ILS Learning Outcomes (found in Enclosure (1)):

Area 1				Area 2					Area 3						Area 4			Area 5			
A	B	C	D	A	B	C	D	E	A	B	C	D	E	F	A	B	C	A	B	C	D
									X	X		X	X	X	X	X					

Course Overview

8907, *Amphibious Operations,* enables students to actively participate in planning cells of any type (joint, combined, Service, etc.) and discuss and plan amphibious operations. Students learn to identify amphibious planning considerations, to understand the amphibious planning process, and to contribute immediately to the joint planning and execution effort. Gaining proficiency and a detailed understanding of the 8907 course will enable students to expand the ideas presented in the *MAGTF Expeditionary Operations* course (8906) and examine the applicability of those ideas in amphibious operations.

Lesson 1, Concepts and Organization, reviews the joint doctrine used to execute amphibious operations. It also provided an overview of the organization for amphibious operations—focusing on the expeditionary strike group concept and command relationships, as well as their impact on the Navy and Marine Corps expeditionary forces. While the nature and purpose of amphibious operations have remained unchanged through time, the equipment, task-organization, and command structure continue to evolve.

Amphibious operations are still a vital component of U.S. national power projection. However, the complexity of amphibious operations and the vulnerability of forces engaged in these operations require an exceptional degree of unity of effort and operational coherence.

Read:

- "Marine Corps Operating Concepts for a Changing Security Environment" (March 2006): pp. 33 to 42 (9 pages).
- Joint Pub 3-02, *Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations*, 19 Sep 2001, pp. I-1 to I-6, XIII-1 to XIII-3, and XV-4 to XV-13 (17 pages).
- Joint Pub 3-18, *Joint Doctrine for Forcible Entry Operations*, 16 Jul 2001, pp. I-1 to I-5 (4 pages).
- MCDP 1-0, *Marine Corps Operations*, 21 Sep 2001, pp. 2-6 to 2-9 (4 pages).
- "The Naval Services: At Risk of Irrelevance," *Marine Corps Gazette*, John C. Berry, Jr., Mar 2006, pp. 35-39 (3 pages).
- Joint Pub 3-02, *Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations*, 19 Sep 2001, pp. I-6 to I-7 (2 pages).
- "Naval Operating Concept for Joint Operations" (22 September 2003), pp. 7 to 8 (2 pages).
- "Memorandum of Understanding Between the USMC and USN Regarding the Employability of an ESG and Major Subordinate Elements Employed Within" (22 June 2006), pp. 1 to 2 (2 pages).
- "Expeditionary Strike Group Concepts and Recommendations," Col Michael R. Kennedy, *Marine Corps Gazette*, March 2006, pp. 16 to 25 (7 pages).
- Joint Pub 3-02, Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations, 19 September 2001, pp. II-2 to II-7 (5 pages).
- "Expeditionary Strike Group Operations," LtCol Timothy G. Callahan, *Marine Corps Gazette*, March 2006, pp. 26 to 29 (3 pages).

View:

- "Joint Forcible Entry Operations." Marine Corps Combat Video: (10 minutes).

Lesson 2, Amphibious Planning, discusses the decision making process in amphibious planning from the joint doctrinal perspective. Amphibious planning is distinguished by the necessity for concurrent, parallel, and detailed planning by all participating forces.

Since Inchon is the last major opposed amphibious landing the Marine Corps performed and Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm (DS/DS) is the last major opposed amphibious landing the Marine Corps planned, they are studied for both positive and negative aspects of amphibious planning.

Read:

- JP 3-02, *Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations* (2001): pp. I-6 to I-8 and II-4 (3 pages).
- "A Contrast In Capabilities: Amphibious Forces At Inchon and SWA." Major M.G. Dana. CSC History Paper (1995): pp. 56-58 (3 pages).
- JP 3-02, *Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations* (2001): pp. IV-2 to IV-4 (3 pages).
- Joint Pub 3-02.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Landing Force Operations (2004): pp. II-1 to II-11 (11 pages).
- "A Contrast In Capabilities: Amphibious Forces At Inchon and SWA." Major M.G. Dana. CSC History Paper (1995): pp. 48-50 (3 pages).
- LtGen Victor H. Krulak, *First to Fight*, Naval Institute Press (1984): pp. 120 to 140 (21 pages).
- "Joint Power Projection: OPERATION TORCH." John Gordon IV. *Joint Forces Quarterly* (Spring 1994): pp. 60 to 69 (10 pages).
- JP 3-18, *Joint Doctrine for Forcible Entry Operations* (2001): pp. III-5 to III-9 (5 pages).

Listen:

- "Power Talk" with Peter Stulting: Interview with LtGen Victor H. Krulak, USMC (Ret) (20 minutes).

View:

- Operation Chromite Interactive Multimedia Element (IME) (20 minutes).

Lesson 3, Amphibious Fires and Logistics, examines two central issues in the planning and conduct of amphibious operations. This lesson addresses supporting fires and logistics. Even though both are independent issues, they are similar in that they are important to successful amphibious operations, and because both require naval platforms.

- Planning and employing supporting fires requires not just the appropriate assets (organic and nonorganic), but the proper organization and relationship between fire support agencies to ensure the coordination, integration, and teamwork required.
- Because amphibious operations are complex, logistical challenges drastically increase, as does overcoming them. Additional planning factors must be addressed, so landing forces have combat service support from the seabase, when and where it is needed.

Read:

- MCWP 3-31.6, Supporting Arms Coordination in Amphibious Operations (2004): pp. 2-13 to 2-15 (3 pages).
- JP 3-02, *Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations* (2001): pp. III-1 to III-4 and III-6 to III-9 (7 pages).
- "Marine Corps Views and Recommendations for Naval Surface Fire Support" Gen Michael W. Hagee, CMC Memo for the Secretary of the Navy, (March 2006): pp.1 to 5 (5 pages).
- "NSFS Shortfalls." LtCol James W. Hammond III, USMC (Ret.) *Marine Corps Gazette* (March 2006): pp. 31 to 34 (4 pages).
- "Naval Fires in Support of Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare, Concept of Employment for 2008-2018", USMC/USN memo (August 2005): pp: B-3 to B-10, B-27 to B-28, B-47 to B-48, B-50 to B-51 (14 pages).
- JP 3-02.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Landing Force Operations (2004): pp. IX-1 to IX-22 (22 pages).
- NWP 3-62M/MCWP 3-31.7, *Seabasing,* (2006): pp. 1-1 to 1-5 (5 pages).
- MCCDC/NDC 21st Century Warfighting Concept, *Seabased Logistics* (1998), pp. 1 to 9 (9 pages).
- JP 4-01.6, *Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore* (2005): pp. I-3 to I-5 and II-11 to II-19 (12 pages).

Lesson 4, Anti-Access, reviews the various means that opposing forces use to defeat or deny amphibious forces from conducting landings. The goal of anti-access is to deny enemies the required time and access to prepare for operations. Anti-access capabilities include mines, missiles, aircraft, submarines, ships, counterattack forces, and surveillance assets—all of which make entering into operating areas a deadly challenge.

We must assume that in the future U.S. forces will have to conduct operations in anti-access environments. Potential enemy nations and non-nation players will continue to pursue anti-access capabilities. By exploiting the maneuverability of the seabase, we can mitigate anti-access threats and capitalize on operations without interference (i.e., control of the relevant international sea, air, and cyberspace).

Read:

- "Forcible Entry is a Strategic Necessity." *Proceedings* (November 2004). Frank G. Hoffman: p. 2 (1 page).
- JP 3-15, Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine Warfare for Joint Operations (2007): pp. IV-1 to IV-5 (5 pages).
- *The Mine Threat to Amphibious Warfare* (2003). Major Michael O'Neal, USMC, pp. 1 to 6 (6 pages).
- JP 3-01, Countering Air and Missile Threats (2007): p. I-8 (1 page)
- JP 3-15, Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine Warfare for Joint Operations (2007): pp. IV-5 to IV-8 (3 pages).
- JP 3-01, *Countering Air and Missile Threats* (2007): pp. V-22 and V-26 to V-28 (4 pages).

- *Final Report to Congress: Conduct of the Persian Gulf War* (April 1992): pp. 199 to 208 and pp. 216 to 217 (9 pages).
- *The Generals' War* (1995). Michael R. Gordon and LtGen. (Ret.) Bernard E. Trainor: pp.343 to 345 (3 pages).

View:

- ASPC, "Anti-Access Strategy: An Asymmetric Threat." *Countering Anti-Access Strategies* module (2006): (1 minute).
- Air and Space Power Course (ASPC), "Anti-Access Strategy: An Asymmetric Threat." *Introduction* module (2006) (1 minute).
- ASPC, "Anti-Access Strategy: An Asymmetric Threat." *Anti-Access: Strategy* module (2006) (1 minute).
- ASPC, "Anti-Access Strategy: An Asymmetric Threat." *Anti-Access: A Strategy Threat* module (2006) (1 minute).
- ASPC, "Anti-Access Strategy: An Asymmetric Threat." *Anti-Access: Weapons Threat* module (2006) (1 minute).
- ASPC, "Anti-Access Strategy: An Asymmetric Threat." *Anti-Access: Political Threats* module (2006) (1 minute).

Course Assessments

Students will be evaluated through three types of assessment activities: 40 points for discussion contribution, 20 points for multiple choice quizzes, and 40 points for the essay final examination—for a total of 100 points. A mastery score of 80 points for the entire course is required to pass.

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8908, Operation Planning (and Final Exercise)

8908, *Operation Planning (and Final Exercise),* is designed to enhance the warfighting and irregular warfare planning abilities of future commanders and staff officers by helping them develop a working knowledge of the Marine Corps Planning Process (MCPP) within the framework of joint and Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) operational doctrine.

This course exercises the students' creative thinking and critical reasoning abilities, which are necessary to perform MEF-level operation planning in joint and multinational environments. Course learning methods include reading, seminar discussions, scenario based interactive multimedia instruction (IMI), and multiple practical application exercises.

Course Composition

Lesson	Study/Prep Time [1]	Contact Time [2]
Lesson 1, Operation Planning: Introduction and Overview	4.1 hrs	3.0 hrs
Lesson 2, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB) and the Commander's Battlespace Area Evaluation (CBAE)	3.8 hrs	3.0 hrs
Lesson 3, Mission Analysis	3.4 hrs	3.0 hrs
Lesson 4, Mission Analysis Practical Exercise	4.8 hrs	3.0 hrs
Lesson 5, COA Development and War Game	4.8 hrs	3.0 hrs
Lesson 6, COA Development Practical Exercise	2.8 hrs	3.0 hrs
Lesson 7, COA War Game Practical Exercise	2.6 hrs	3.0 hrs
Lesson 8, COA Comparison and Decision, Orders Development, and Transition	3.1 hrs	3.0 hrs
Lesson F1 Mission Analysis for Stability Operations	3.5 hrs	3.0 hrs
Lesson F2 COA Development for Stability Operations	2.5 hrs	3.0 hrs
Lesson F3 COA Wargaming for Stability Operations	1.8 hrs	3.0 hrs
Final Exam	None	None
Total	**37.2 hrs**	**33.0 hrs**

[1] Study and preparation time based on 20 pages of reading per hour.
[2] Contact time is seminar hours plus assessment completion hours.

Course Objectives

Each lesson has specific educational objectives, which have been derived from the following Marine Corps PME ILS Learning Outcomes (found in Enclosure (1)):

Area 1				Area 2					Area 3						Area 4			Area 5			
A	B	C	D	A	B	C	D	E	A	B	C	D	E	F	A	B	C	A	B	C	D
	X		X	X	X		X			X					X	X	X				

Course Overview

This course covers the six steps of the MCPP: mission analysis, course of action (COA) development, COA war game, COA comparison and decision, orders development, and transition. It also facilitates the application of the MCPP for a MEF-level operation, which includes conventional and irregular warfare in a joint and multinational operational environment. The course uses current doctrine and emerging concepts, IMI, an exercise scenario, planning product examples, role playing, and planning product development to obtain its goal and accomplish its objectives.

Lesson 1, Operation Planning: Introduction and Overview, introduces the concept of operation planning and the MCPP; operational design and the three tenets of Marine Corps planning (top-down planning, the single battle, and integrated planning); the six-step MCPP process; and the operational planning team (OPT).

Read:

- MCDP 1-0, *Marine Corps Operations* (2001): pp. 6-3 to 6-9 (7 pages).
- "1st Marine Division and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM." LtCol Clarke R. Lethin. *Marine Corps Gazette* (February 2004): pp. 20 to 22 (3 pages).
- MCWP 5-1, *Marine Corps Planning Process* (2001): pp. 1-1 to 1-4, Appendix B and C-1 to C-9 (15 pages).
- Joint Pub 3-33, *Joint Task Force Headquarters* (2007): pp. IX-4 to IX-15 (12 pages).
- MSTP Pamphlet 5-0.2, *Operational Planning Team Guide* (2001): pp. 11 to 15 and 113 to 116 (9 pages).
- BARBARY SWORD Exercise Guide, Key Events Timeline, Crisis in Tunisia, Part 1 and USEUCOM BARBARY SWORD WARNING ORDER (2007): pp. 1 to 7 and 9 to 12 (11 pages).

View:

- *MCPP Overview* IMI: (36 minutes).

Lesson 2, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB) and the Commander's Battlespace Area Evaluation (CBAE), introduces the IPB process (joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment in the joint community). It exposes students to the four-step IPB process, key intelligence products, and various decision support tools generated within the IPB process. It also explains how to incorporate cultural intelligence into the IPB process. Furthermore, this lesson presents the CBAE, which consists of commander's critical information requirements, commander's intent, centers of gravity analysis, and the commander's battlespace framework.

Read:

- FM 34-130, *Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield* (1994): pp. 1-1 to 1-13 (13 pages).
- MCWP 5-1, *Marine Corps Planning Process* (2001): pp. D-1 to D-10 and 2-2 to 2-4 (13 pages).
- FM 5-0, *Army Planning and Orders Production* (2005): pp. 3-7 to 3-9 (3 pages).
- MCDP 1-0, *Marine Corps Operations* (2001): pp. 4-3 to 4-10 (8 pages).
- JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning* (2006): pp. IV-8 to IV-15 (8 pages).
- BARBARY SWORD Exercise Guide, *USEUCOM Planning Directive for Operation BARBARY SWORD* (2007): pp. 13 to 18 (6 pages).

View:

- *IPB and CBAE* IMI: (30 minutes).

Lesson 3, Mission Analysis, covers the inputs (beyond the IPB and CBAE), the process, and the outputs of mission analysis. This lesson also introduces four key analytical planning means that support the planning process: lines of operation, the proper use of terminology, assessment, and information management (IM).

Read:

- MCWP 5-1, *Marine Corps Planning Process* (2001): pp. 2-4 to 2-9 (6 pages).
- JP 3-0, *Joint Operations* (2006): pp. IV-12 to IV-13 (2 pages).
- FM 3-0, *Operations* (2001): pp. 5-7 to 5-9 (3 pages).
- MSTP Pamphlet 6-9, *Assessment* (2000): pp. 25 to 32.
- JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning* (2006): pp. III-57 to III-63 (7 pages).
- MCWP 3-40.2, *Information Management* (2002): pp. 1-1 to 1-10 and pp. A-1 to A-4 (14 pages).

View:

- *Mission Analysis* IMI: (50 minutes).

Lesson 4, Mission Analysis Practical Exercise, is the first of six practical exercises that enhance the student's knowledge of the MCPP through its practical application. It utilizes a joint and multinational operational scenario to begin the planning for a MEF-level conventional attack on a linear battlefield. During this exercise session, center of gravity and task analyses are performed to develop a mission statement and refine the commander's intent.

Read:

- BARBARY SWORD Exercise Guide, *CTF-Tunisia OPORD 0002-XX* (base order and Annexes A, C, and J [including appendices and tabs]): pp. 19 to 37, A-1 to A-17, C-1 to C-19-2, and J-1 to J-1-2; and *CTF-T FRAGORD 02 to OPORD 0002-XX* (2007): pp. 67 to 70 (90 pages).

- Phase II OPORD Summary and MEF Commander's Orientation: pp. 1 to 3 (3 pages).

Lesson 5, COA Development and War Game, covers the inputs, process, and outputs of both the COA development and COA war game steps. COA development permits commanders and staffs to generate ideas and concepts that satisfy mission requirements, while allowing other ideas or requirements to be set aside for later consideration. The COA war game step provides realistic, detailed insights into the sequence of possible battlespace events and activities through the evaluation of each COA against a thinking enemy. Wargaming helps commanders identify additional essential tasks, certain advantages, and specific vulnerabilities that were not previously apparent.

Read:

- MCWP 5-1, *Marine Corps Planning Process* (2001): pp. 3-1 to 3-5, D-10 to D-14, 4-1 to 4-4 and D-14 (15 pages).
- MCDP 1-0, *Marine Corps Operations* (2001): pp. 6-29 to 6-30 (2 pages).
- MSTPP 2-0.1, *The Red Cell* (2001): pp. 1 to 5 (5 pages).

View:

- *COA Development* IMI: (80 minutes).
- *COA War Game* IMI: (72 minutes).

Lesson 6, COA Development Practical Exercise, is the second practical exercise and is meant to enhance the warfighting skills of future commanders and staff officers by developing a common, in-depth understanding of COA development. It also provides an opportunity for students to demonstrate an understanding of the purpose, considerations, and criteria for developing COAs; and how to articulate COAs in graphic and written formats. The initial draft of the COA synchronization matrix will also be developed during this lesson.

Review:

- BARBARY SWORD Exercise Guide (2007): (60 minutes).
- All planning products produced during step one, mission analysis: (60 minutes).

Lesson 7, COA War Game Practical Exercise, is the third practical exercise is designed to educate students on how wargaming helps planners (1) visualize the COA flow of battle; (2) foresee the friendly action, enemy reaction, and friendly counteraction of the fight; and (3) help identify critical events, tasks, requirements, problems, and solutions. It provides students an opportunity to experience the wargaming process and gain an appreciation for the value of the red cell. The war game worksheet decision support and event templates and matrices will be developed during this lesson, while the synchronization matrix is fleshed out.

Review:

- BARBARY SWORD Exercise Guide (2007): (30 minutes).
- All planning products produced during step two, COA development: (30 minutes).

View:

- Command and Staff College Resident School BARBARY DAGGER Exercise COA War Game Demonstration: (48 minutes).

Lesson 8, COA Comparison and Decision, Orders Development, and Transition, covers the inputs, process and outputs of the COA comparison and decision step, the orders development step, and the transition step. COA comparison and decision is the commander's formal opportunity to decide on the COA that will best accomplish his mission. The OPT ensures that the commander's modifications are incorporated into the COA and its supporting documentation. These outputs go into the orders development to produce a coherent, properly formatted, concise operations order or plan. Finally, the order or plan is given by the planners to the executing forces. A successful transition enhances situational awareness, preserves the integrity of the concept of operations, and promotes unity of effort.

Read:

- MCWP 5-1, *Marine Corps Planning Process* (2001): pp. 5-1 to 5-3, 6-1 to 6-2, G-1 to G-11 and 7-1 to 7-3 (19 pages).

View:

- COA Comparison and Decision IMI: (25 minutes).
- *Orders Development* IMI: (30 minutes).
- *Transition* IMI: (25 minutes).

Lesson F1, Mission Analysis for Stability Operations, is the fourth practical exercise, and the first of three Final Exercise irregular warfare planning sessions. It analyzes the inputs, process, and outputs, including campaign design, IPB, and CBAE, which are unique in stability operations; and also facilitates the practical application of mission analysis in a non-linear operational environment. Planning products that will be completed during this lesson include enemy and friendly center of gravity analysis; identification of logical lines of operation; implied and essential tasks; requests for information and commander's critical information requirements; and, a mission statement.

Read:

- JP 3-0, *Joint Operations* (2006): pp. V-23 to V-28 (6 pages).
- FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, *Counterinsurgency* (2006): pp. 4-1 to 4-9 (9 pages).
- "In Search of the Single Battle." LtCol Wayne A. Sinclair. *Marine Corps Gazette* (February 2007): pp. 64 to 68 (5 pages).

- "Rethinking MCPP." Steven A. Hardesty. Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory's *Thoughts on the Operational Art* (2006): pp. 57 to 65 (9 pages).
- *Campaign Planning: Tools of the Trade,* 2nd Edition (2006). Dr. Jack D. Kem, Col, USA (Ret.). U.S. Army Command and General Staff College: pp. 31 to 43 (13 pages).
- BARBARY SWORD Exercise Guide, CTF-T FRAGORD 03 to OPORD 0002-XX and II MEF CBAE for FRAGORD 03 to II MEF OPORD 0002-XX (2007): pp.147 to 151 and 153 to 154 (7 pages).

View:

- Phase III Orientation & CTF-T CBAE: (34 slides).
- Phase III Cultural IPB Brief: (10 slides).
- Phase III MEF Mission Analysis Brief: (36 slides).

Lesson F2, COA Development for Stability Operations, is the fifth practical exercise and facilitates the practical application of the second planning process step for stability operations, and the planned employment of the elements of national power—diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME). The following will be devised during this lesson: methods and end state for each given line of operation; information operations concept of support; war game guidance recommendations; and COA evaluation criteria recommendations.

Read:

- FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, *Counterinsurgency* (2006): pp. 5-1 to 5-31 (31 pages).
- *Campaign Planning: Tools of the Trade,* 2nd edition, (2006). Dr. Jack D. Kem, Col, USA (Ret.). U.S. Army Command and General Staff College: pp. 25 to 30 (6 pages).
- Commander's COA Development Guidance: (2 pages).

View:

- Phase III MEF COA Development Brief: (34 slides).

Lesson F3, COA Wargaming for Stability Operations, is the final practical exercise. It facilitates the practical application of the third planning process step for stability operations and highlights the importance of creating a wargaming cell for each significant non-traditional actor in the operational environment. Planning products that will be developed during this lesson include the COA war game worksheet, and decision support template and matrix.

Read:

- *Campaign Planning: Tools of the Trade*, 2nd edition (2006). Dr. Jack D. Kem, Col, USA (Ret.). U.S. Army Command and General Staff College: pp. 67 to 72 (5 pages).
- *A Tentative Manual for Countering Irregular Threats* (2006). Marine Corps Combat Development Command Concepts and Plans Division: pp. 57 to 59, 73 to 75, 89 to 91, 101 to 104, 117 to 118, and 131 to 134 (19 pages).

View:

- Phase III MEF COA War Game Brief: (34 slides).

Course Assessments

Students will be evaluated through 3 types of assessment activities: 55 points for discussion contribution, 30 points for multiple choice quizzes, and 65 points for planning product development—for a total of 150 points. A mastery score of 120 points or better for the entire course is required.

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Marine Corps PME Intermediate-Level School Learning Outcomes

Learning Area 1 — National and International Processes, Strategy, and Culture

a. Analyze foreign cultures and assess the role of culture in confronting contemporary security challenges. (CIAO)
b. Assess the impact of cultural issues throughout the planning and execution of military operations. (WF)
c. Explain the process by which policy and strategic decisions are made and how the process is integrated with decisions made at the operational level of war. (CIAO)
d. Analyze the use of all instruments of national power and evaluate interagency operations in employing those instruments. (CIAO)

Learning Area 2 — Operational Level of War

a. Demonstrate an ability to think critically and analytically about campaigns and operational art, and be able to express their thoughts in both oral and written form. (OpArt)
b. Identify the linkages between strategy, operations and tactics that inform and shape campaign planning and design. (OpArt)
Explain the link between ends and means in strategy, operations and tactics. (OpArt)
c. Evaluate the nature of insurgency and terrorism and assess methods for combating them. (CIAO)
d. Assess the relationship among the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war and conceptualize solutions that create the military conditions necessary for strategic success. (WF)

Learning Area 3 — Expeditionary Operations and Warfighting

a. Analyze doctrinal concepts that inform the employment of joint and MAGTF resources throughout the spectrum of crisis and conflict. (WF)
b. Discuss emerging and non-traditional concepts that are shaping the character of contemporary joint and multinational warfare. (WF)
c. Examine the differences and balance among Information Operations, Strategic Communications, and Public Affairs. (Ldr)
d. Apply lessons learned from history to the planning and execution of military operations. (WF)
e. Discuss joint doctrine for amphibious operations and distinguish between the different types and their relationship to MAGTF, joint and multinational operations. (CCE)
f. Explain the doctrine and concepts for MAGTF operations in support of expeditionary operations, namely amphibious, MPF, and MEU(SOC) operations. (CCE)

Learning Area 4 — Marine Corps Planning

a. Apply effective planning processes for employment of the MAGTF throughout the spectrum of crisis and conflict, maximizing both lethal and non-lethal effects in a joint and/or multinational context (WF)

b. Explain the Marine Corps Planning Process as a practical methodology for analytical military problem solving. (WF)

c. Integrate interagency organizations into the planning and execution of military operations. (WF)

Learning Area 5 — Leadership

a. Discuss the ethical and legal dimensions of warfighting leadership in a cross-cultural environment (Ldr)

b. Explain how to establish a command climate that develops subordinate leaders. (Ldr)

c. Explain how to negotiate, bargain, and coordinate in a cross-cultural environment. (Ldr)

d. Discuss the various methodologies for responding to challenges and concerns, and establishing professional relationships with junior officer and enlisted personnel. (Ldr)

Service Intermediate-Level School Joint PME Learning Areas and Objectives[1]

Learning Area 1 — National Military Capabilities, Command Structure and Strategic Guidance

a. Comprehend the capabilities and limitations of US military forces to conduct the full range of military operations against the capabilities of 21st century adversaries.
b. Comprehend the organizational framework within which joint forces are created, employed and sustained.
c. Comprehend the purpose, roles, functions and relationships of the President and the SecDef, NSC, CJCS, JCS, combatant commanders, JFCs, Service component commanders and combat support organizations.
d. Comprehend how joint force command relationships and directive authority for logistics support joint warfighting capabilities.
e. Comprehend how the US military is organized to plan, execute, sustain and train for joint, interagency and multinational operations.
f. Comprehend the strategic guidance contained in the national security strategy, national military strategy and national military strategy for the global war on terrorism.

Learning Area 2 – Joint Doctrine and Concepts

a. Comprehend current joint doctrine.
b. Comprehend the factors and emerging concepts influencing joint doctrine.
c. Apply solutions to operational problems using current joint doctrine.
d. Comprehend the interrelationship between Service doctrine and joint doctrine.

Learning Area 3 — Joint and Multinational Forces at the Operational Level of War

a. Comprehend the considerations for employing joint and multinational forces at the operational level of war.
b. Comprehend how theory and principles of war pertain to the operational level of war.
c. Analyze a plan for employment of joint forces at the operational level of war.
d. Comprehend the relationships among national objectives, military objectives and conflict termination, as illustrated by previous wars, campaigns and operations.
e. Comprehend the relationships among the strategic, operational and tactical levels of war.
f. Comprehend the relationships between all elements of national power (diplomatic, informational, military and economic) and the importance of interagency and multinational coordination in these elements, including homeland security and defense.

Learning Area 4 — Joint Planning and Execution Processes

a. Comprehend the relationship among national objectives and means available through the framework provided by joint planning processes.

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[1] From Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 1800.01C, *Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP)* of 22 December 2005

b. Comprehend the effect of time, coordination, policy changes and political development on the planning process.
c. Comprehend how the defense planning systems affect joint operational planning and force planning.
d. Comprehend how national, joint and Service intelligence organizations support JFCs and their Service component commanders.
e. Comprehend the fundamentals of campaign planning.
f. Comprehend the roles that factors such as geopolitics, geostrategy, society, culture and religion play in shaping planning and execution of joint force operations across the range of military operations.

Learning Area 5 — Information Operations, Command and Control (C2) and Battlespace Awareness

a. Comprehend how information operations are integrated in support of national and military strategies.
b. Comprehend how information operations are incorporated into both deliberate and crisis-action planning processes at the operational and JTF levels.
c. Know how C2 and battlespace awareness apply at the operational level of war and how they support operations conducted by a networked force.
d. Comprehend how increased reliance on information technology throughout the range of military operations creates opportunities and vulnerabilities.

Final Exam and Discussion Grading Rubrics

The final exam and discussion grading rubrics use the general grading design. That is, the final is 40 percent (40 points based on 100 total points for the course) and the discussions are 40 percent (40 points based on 100 total points for the course). A few courses have different point distributions but the grading rubric remains the same.

Final Exam Grading Rubric

Central Ideas (30 points total, 6 points ea. [1])

Points	Unsatisfactory: 0-4.7	Average: 4.8-5.3	Superior: 5.4-6.0	SCORE

Demonstrates mastery of the educational objectives.
   Unsatisfactory: Masters some of the EOs
   Average: Masters most of the EOs
   Superior: Masters all but a few of the EOs				

Demonstrates understanding of relevant and important issues, theory, principles and concepts.
   Unsatisfactory: Understands some of the issues, theory, principles, and concepts
   Average: Understands most of the issues, theory, principles, and concepts
   Superior: Understands all but a few of the issues, theory, principles, and concepts				

Uses the preceding information to convey evidence or support of thesis.
   Unsatisfactory: Poor or inappropriate use of information as evidence or support
   Average: Good use of appropriate information as evidence or support
   Superior: Outstanding use of appropriate information as evidence or support				

Shows depth of understanding important relationships. Unsatisfactory to superior represents a subjective scale of depth relative to your expectation of how much the student should know based on your discussions and the curriculum content.				

Presents fully developed, coherent, and logical response.
   Unsatisfactory: Poorly developed response inadequately supported by logic
   Average: Well developed response adequately supported by logic
   Superior: Fully developed response fully supported by logic				

Details (4 points total, 1 point ea. [1])

Points	Unsatisfactory: 0-0.7	Average: 0.8	Superior: 0.9-1.0	SCORE

Appropriately used in defense of thesis.
   Unsatisfactory: Some of the details used were appropriate
   Average: Most of the details used were appropriate
   Superior: All of the details used were appropriate				

Adequate in number.
   Unsatisfactory: Some relevant details used
   Average: Adequate number of relevant details used
   Superior: Many relative details used				

Adequate in quality.
   Unsatisfactory: Some details lacked quality
   Average: Few details lacked quality
   Superior: No details lacked quality				

Details are factual.
   Unsatisfactory: Some details are factual
   Average: Most details are factual
   Superior: All details are factual				

Organization and Structure (6 points total, 1 point ea. [1])

Points	Unsatisfactory: 0-0.7	Average: 0.8	Superior: 0.9-1.0	SCORE

Takes a position.
    Unsatisfactory: Fails to take a position or position can be detected with some difficulty
    Average: Position can be detected with little difficulty
    Superior: Takes a distinct position				

Clearly states thesis.
    Unsatisfactory: Theses unclear, or unstated, but point of paper somewhat evident
    Average: Thesis fairly clear and evident, but not stated in the beginning of the paper
    Superior: Thesis clear, evident and stated in the beginning of the paper				

Focuses toward supporting thesis.
    Unsatisfactory: Provided some support for thesis
    Average: Provided an adequate amount of support for thesis
    Superior: Provided an overwhelming amount of support for thesis				

Paragraph and sentence structure logically organized.
    Unsatisfactory: Paragraph and sentence structure poorly organized
    Average: Most paragraph and sentence structure logically organized
    Superior: All paragraph and sentence structure logically organized				

Sentence structure and fluency.
    Unsatisfactory: Poor sentence structure; poor flow, difficult to follow
    Average: Adequate sentence structure; satisfactory flow, can follow without difficulty
    Superior: Precise and appropriate structure; coherent and consistent flow, easy to follow				

Grammar.
    Unsatisfactory: Frequent errors in grammar, punctuation, and spelling
    Average: Occasional errors in grammar, punctuation, and spelling
    Superior: Consistently correct grammar, punctuation, and spelling				

[1]   Partial points can be awarded for each subcategory. When finished, add each category individually (central ideas, details, organization and structure) but **do not** round this total. Add the categories together and then round the grand total to the **next** whole number.

Discussion Grading Rubric

Onsite Contribution Assessment. The following rubric is used to measure contributions for **onsite** students.

Onsite Contribution (5 points total per seminar, 1 point ea.)

Elements of Reasoning	Low: 0 – 0.7	Average 0.8	High 0.9 - 1.0	Total
Demonstrates creative or innovative thought.				
Demonstrates ability to synthesize material.				
Exhibits an understanding of concepts.				
Expresses ideas clearly.				
Engages peers intellectually.				
Onsite Seminar Contribution Total				

Online Contribution Assessment. The next two rubrics are used to measure contributions for **online** students.

Online Student-to-Instructor Contribution (3 points total per seminar, 0.5 point ea.)

Elements of Reasoning	Low: 0 – 0.3	Average 0.4	High 0.5	Total
Demonstrates creative or innovative thought.				
Demonstrates ability to synthesize material.				
Exhibits an understanding of concepts.				
Expresses ideas clearly.				
Engages peers intellectually.				
Demonstrates effective written communication.				
Student-to-Instructor Response Total				

Online Student-to-Student Contribution (2 points total per seminar, 0.5 point ea.)

Elements of Reasoning	Low: 0 – 0.3	Average 0.4	High 0.5	Total
Demonstrates creative or innovative thought.				
Exhibits an understanding of concepts.				
Expresses ideas clearly.				
Engages peers intellectually.				
Student-to-Student Response Total				

These two rubrics are added to determine the online student's total contribution assessment.

Total Online Contribution (5 points total per seminar)

Student-to-Instructor Response Total	
Student-to-Student Response Total	
Online Seminar Contribution Total	

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Command and Staff College
Distance Education Program

Informed by the study of history and culture, the Command and Staff College Distance Education Program (CSCDEP) educates and trains its joint, multinational, and interagency professionals to produce skilled warfighting leaders able to overcome diverse 21st Century security challenges. We provide intermediate level joint professional military education (JPME) at a distance to prepare our graduates to perform effectively in command and staff duties with Marine air-ground task forces (MAGTFs) and for assignment with joint, interagency, and multinational organizations. The CSCDEP Branch provides this education through a variety of educationally sound delivery methods and through cost-effective and dynamic media to ensure that timely and relevant curricula reach all distance students at the right time and right place.

CSCDEP is a 70 week part-time learning program and is CD and online-based. Using the same instructional material, the program in delivered using three methods: onsite, online, and blended. All instructional methods allow students to learn and interact with an instructor and their peers. Each provides a forum where the instructor and students can ask questions and participate in relevant Socratic discussions and learning. All students are enrolled and access course assignments and assessments through the Blackboard learning support system.

http://www.tecom.usmc.mil/cce/programs/pme/csc.asp